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Abstract
This dissertation consists of three chapters. The main topic I study through
them is fluctuations in terms of trade and their effects in small open economies.
In particular, I study their effects in the labor and financial markets.
In Chapter 1, I study the how the labor market and real GDP interact to
fluctuations in the terms of trade. Conventional wisdom suggests that when
terms of trade deteriorate in small open economies, real GDP decreases. In
this paper, I document that the correlation between terms of trade and real
GDP innovations varies widely between both positive and negative values across
different countries. Furthermore, I show that this variation cannot be explained
by income alone. This raises the question, why do countries’ real GDPs react
differently toward changes in their terms of trade? I show evidence that the
way in which countries react toward changes in terms of trade is linked to the
labor market. I build a real business cycle model in which a small open economy
experiences terms of trade fluctuations in conjunction with real wage rigidity. I
find that an economy with a real wage rigidity is able to produce either a positive
or a negative correlation between terms of trade and real GDP innovations.
In Chapter 2, Sora Lee and I study the relationship between terms of trade
fluctuations and changes in the sovereign government interest rate spreads in
emerging economies. We propose a stochastic general equilibrium model of
sovereign default with endogenous default risk in order to explain the interest
rate behavior in emerging economies. We incorporate two types of shocks to
cover a foreign and a domestic uncertainty. We define as the domestic and the
foreign uncertainty, GDP and terms of trade shock, respectively. The model is
able to successfully increase the dispersion of sovereign interest rates when GDP
vshocks are above the trend. This result seems to suggest that terms of trade is a
good candidate to explain the volatility of interest rates in small open economies
when they are not under recessions or crises.
In Chapter 3, I study the optimal choice of foreign issued debt incurred by
a sovereign government in a small open economy. In particular, what are the
shortcomings and benefits from issuing debt in a currency tightly linked to a
trade partner country. I propose a two period model with uncertainty in the
terms of trade and in a real exchange rate to show the benefits and costs. I find
that when a government is in a deep recession, issuing debt in a currency that is
not tightly linked to their trade becomes optimal.
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Chapter 1
Terms of trade and
unemployment in the business
cycle
1.1 Introduction
Conventional wisdom suggests that when terms of trade deteriorate, small
open economies are negatively affected. This deterioration implies a contraction
of available resources. Thus, the country becomes poorer, making macroeconomic
indicators such as real GDP fall. This notion is summarized in Easterly, Islam and
Stiglitz (2001) which states, "For small open economies, adverse terms of trade
shocks can have much the same effect as negative technology shocks, and this is
one of the important differences between macroeconomics in these economies and
that which underlies some of the traditional closed economy models."
1
2In this paper, I argue that the conventional narrative regarding terms of trade
is not entirely consistent with the data. I document that the shock correlation
between terms of trade and real GDP varies widely between positive and nega-
tive values across 122 countries. Furthermore, this variation is not explained by
income levels alone. This raises the question, why do countries react differently
toward terms of trade shocks? I show evidence that the way in which countries
react toward terms of trade shocks is linked to their labor markets. Specifically,
when unemployment reacts positively to increases in the terms of trade, real GDP
reacts negatively.
Modeling the relationship between real GDP and terms of trade is not trivial.
Kehoe and Ruhl (2008) show that standard models fail to generate a negative
correlation between terms of trade and real GDP innovations. This is because
an economy becomes poorer when facing an adverse terms of trade shock. With
standard elasticities, this increases employment, and, as a result, real GDP in-
creases. Because conventional wisdom suggests small open economies are neg-
atively affected by deteriorating terms of trade, the literature has only focused
on addressing what type of assumptions or frictions generate this negative rela-
tion. In this paper, I propose a mechanism that is able to account for not only
a negative, but also a positive correlation between terms of trade and real GDP
innovations. I build a real business cycle model in which a small open economy
experiences terms of trade fluctuations in conjunction with real wage rigidity.
The model illustrates how the effect of an adverse terms of trade shock on
labor and real GDP in a small open economy is determined by whether or not
the real wage rigidity is binding. Given an adverse terms of trade shock, if the
real wage rigidity does not bind, labor and real GDP increase in equilibrium.
On the other hand, when the real wage rigidity does bind, firms hire less labor,
3increasing unemployment and decreasing labor and real GDP.
1.2 Kehoe-Ruhl Observation
It has been of particular interest to study how terms of trade influence small
open economies. Mendoza (1995) finds that terms of trade shocks1 tend to be
large, persistent, and weakly procyclical accounting for nearly half of real GDP
fluctuations. Moreover, in Mendoza (1997) states that for industrial and devel-
oping countries, volatility in the terms of trade has a large and adverse effect on
economic growth. Expanding to these results, Kose (2002) finds that interna-
tional prices fluctuations are the main driver of economic volatility in developing
economies. One of the main sources of influence terms of trade affect an economy
is via the exchange rates. In De Gregorio and Wolf (1994) show that the real
exchange rate fluctuations is mainly driven by the volatility of the terms of trade.
Expanding to this notion, Broda (2004) shows that countries with fixed exchange
rate regimes experience larger contractions in real GDP.
The highlighted relationship between terms of trade changes and movements
in real GDP is difficult to replicate theoretically though. Conventional wisdom
suggests that real GDP should fall after a terms of trade deterioration. This
was challenged in Kehoe and Ruhl (2008) by explaing why standard models with
terms of trade shocks fail to generate changes in real GDP consistent with the
data. There are ways to enrich the standard model to replicate falls in real GDP
due to terms of trade deteriorations. Using Greenwood-Hercowitz-Huffman pref-
1In this paper, terms of trade is defined as the ratio of export to import unit values, mea-
suring at constant import prices. In this sense, a deterioration of the terms of trade will be
reflected as a fall in the terms of trade.
4erences solve the issues because wealth effects are unexistant. In this way, when
having negative terms of trade shocks, households are not willing to supply more
labor even though they become poorer. Another way, de Soyres (2016) proposes a
model with monopolistic competition and love for variety to generate falls in real
GDP via contractions in producers profits when terms of trade deteriorate. Also,
Costa (2017) proposes a model where natural resources are taken into consider-
ation in the household preferences, generating falls in real GDP when terms of
trade deteriorate due to idle resources. Finally, Benguria, Saffie and Urzúa (2018)
uses a downward nominal rigidity and a fixed exchange rate regime to generate
contractions in real GDP via falls in international prices when the rigidity binds.
In this paper I explore deeper this last mechanism. Specifically, I focus in
the ability for wage rigidities to create opposite effects in real GDP for the same
change in the terms of trade. To understand better this observation, let me
illustrate it with a simple example.
1.2.1 Standard Model
Consider a production function F (·, ·, ·) owned by a representative firm that
takes as inputs capital K, labor L, and foreign intermediate inputs M , satisfying
INADA conditions. Let the technology be indexed by z, a productivity parame-
ter. The firm rents capital at a price r, hires labor at a wage w, and buys foreign
intermediate inputs at a price p. The price of p will represent the terms of trade.
5Then, the representative firm’s profit maximization problem is
Max
Y,K,L,M
{Y − rK − wL− pM}
s.t. Y ≤ zF (K,L,M)
Y,K,L,M ≥ 0
This yields the following first order conditions,
rˆ(p) = z ∂F
∂K
(
Kˆ(p), Lˆ(p), Mˆ(p)
)
, wˆ(p) = z∂F
∂L
(
Kˆ(p), Lˆ(p), Mˆ(p)
)
,
and p = z ∂F
∂M
(
Kˆ(p), Lˆ(p), Mˆ(p)
)
.
Here, Kˆ(p) the optimal amount of capital stock rented, Lˆ(p) the optimal amount
of labor hired, and Mˆ(p) the optimal amount of foreign intermediate inputs
bought. Also, rˆ(p) the equilibrium return to capital and wˆ(p) the equilibrium
real wage. Now, let us compute real GDP taking p0 > 0 as the base year price,
GDP (p) ≡ Yˆ (p)− p0Mˆ(p) = zF (Kˆ(p), Lˆ(p), Mˆ(p))− p0Mˆ(p).
Notice that to compute real GDP, a base year price must be used. Computing
the derivative with respect of terms of trade, we find that
GDP ′(p) = z∂F
∂L
(
Kˆ(p), Lˆ(p), Mˆ(p)
)
Kˆ ′(p) + z∂F
∂L
(
Kˆ(p), Lˆ(p), Mˆ(p)
)
Lˆ′(p)
+ z ∂F
∂M
(
Kˆ(p), Lˆ(p), Mˆ(p)
)
Mˆ ′(p)− p0Mˆ ′(p)
= rˆ(p)Kˆ ′(p) + wˆ(p)Lˆ′(p) + (p− p0) Mˆ ′(p).
6Now, note that the capital stock is a decision settled in the previous period,
Kˆ(p) = K. This is, the realization of current terms of trade p only has the
influence in the next period’s capital stock. Therefore, current equilibrium capital
stock does not change with how the realization of terms of trade, Kˆ ′(p) = 0. Also,
if changes in the terms of trade p are small and around the base year p0, then we
have that p ≈ p0. Therefore, the terms of trade first order effects in real GDP
can be approximated as
GDP ′(p) ≈ wˆ(p)Lˆ′(p). (1.1)
With an inelastic supply of labor Lˆ = L, the optimal amount of labor is fixed
regardless of the terms of trade, and thus Lˆ′(p) = 0. Nevertheless, when relaxing
this assumption, the optimal labor can change. Specifically, the optimal labor
changes because the terms of trade changes the equilibrium real wage. For stan-
dard production functions, it is normal to find that real wages fall when there
is a deterioration of the terms of trade, wˆ′(p) < 0. In addition, for standard
elasticity of substitutions from the household preferences between consumption
and leisure, it is common to find Lˆ′(p) > 0. This is, labor increases in equilibrium
for an increase in the terms of trade because households become poorer due to
the fall in real wages. In other words, changes in the real GDP do not move in
the opposite direction to the changes in the terms of trade because GDP ′(p) ≥ 0.
This is the Kehoe-Ruhl observation, standard models are unable to replicate the
negative relationship between changes in real GDP and changes in terms of trade
that the data shows for some countries.
71.2.2 Wage Rigidity Mechanism
Now, let us assume there is a friction in the labor market, the real wage cannot
fall lower than w > 0. When the equilibrium real wage is such that wˆ(p) ≥ w,
then real GDP and labor behaves the same way as the frictionless environment
described in the previous subsection. Nonetheless, this relationship changes when
the real wage rigidity binds. When the real wage rigidity binds, the equilibrium
real wage is fixed, wˆ(p) = w. Using the first order conditions for labor and
foreign intermediate inputs and fixing the equilibrium current capital stock level
to Kˆ(p) = K, the following relationship holds
Lˆ′(p) =
p ∂2F∂L∂M
(
K, Lˆ(p), Mˆ(p)
)
− w ∂2F
∂M2
(
K, Lˆ(p), Mˆ(p)
)
w ∂
2F
∂M∂L
(
K, Lˆ(p), Mˆ(p)
)
− p∂2F
∂L2
(
K, Lˆ(p), Mˆ(p)
)
 Mˆ ′(p).
Because the production function F (·, ·, ·) satisfies the INADA conditions, we know
that ∂2F
∂L2 ,
∂2F
∂M2 < 0 and
∂2F
∂L∂M
, ∂2F
∂M∂L
> 0. Therefore, how the optimal demand
of labor reacts towards terms of trade shares the same direction as how optimal
foreign intermediate inputs react to terms of trade. In addition, with standard
elasticities of substitution in the production function, the optimal foreign inter-
mediate inputs react negatively towards terms of trade, Mˆ ′(p) < 0. When the
real wage rigidity is binding, the equilibrium labor is demand determined. There-
fore, because households are not in their labor supply curve, the equilibrium labor
falls when terms of trade deteriorate. Furthermore, the household preferences will
define a gap between the equilibrium labor and the desired labor supplied in the
economy. This disparity describes the unvoluntary unemployment in equilibrium.
Because equation (1.1) holds as well in this case, real GDP decreases when terms
of trade deteriorate.
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Figure 1.1: Closed form solution real GDP from deterministic example
Note: Deterministic example solution for real GDP using the following parameters: αK =
0.10, αL = 0.45, αM = 0.45, K = 1, L = 1.00, z = 1.00, p0 = 1.00, wlow = 0.2017, and
whigh = 0.2812. The two real wage rigidities were picked so the real wage constraint becomes
binding at ±0.20% from the base terms of trade price p0. The real GDP is deflated level is
deflated by the real GDP obtained when there is no real wage rigidity and the terms of trade
is at base p0 = 1.
Figure 1.1 illustrates how the mechanism affect real GDP. I assume a constant
returns to scale production function F (K,L,M) = KαKLαLMαM and an inelastic
labor supply of labor L. Both figures show with a dashed line how real GDP
moves as terms of trade changes in a frictionless environment. The important
thing to notice is that at the base price terms of trade, the slope of real GDP is
zero. In other words, relatively small changes around the base year terms of trade
yield approximately no changes in real GDP. Panel 1.1(a) shows what happens
when there is a low real wage rigidity. In this case, small changes in the terms of
trade around the base year give the same results as the frictionless case. In other
9words, the terms of trade has to deteriorate substantially in order for the real
wage to fall below the real wage constraint. Thus, for small real wage rigidities,
the economy behave identically to the frictionless economy. In the other hand,
when the real wage rigidity is high enough, real GDP falls when terms of trade
deteriorate. Panel 1.1(b) shows this case. When there is an increase in the
terms of trade, under full-employment the amount of foreign intermediate inputs
decreases. When this input decrease, the marginal productivity of labor falls,
depressing real wages. If the real wage falls below the real wage rigidity, then
labor will decrease in order to increase the marginal utility of labor and satisfy
the real wage constraint. This effect guarantees falls in real GDP when terms of
trade deteriorate.
1.3 Empirical Analysis
I use the World Bank’s World Development Indicator (WDI) database for the
empirical analysis. From it, I extract the series of GDP, exports, and imports
in current and constant prices in local currency units. The analysis will be done
yearly from 1980 to 2017. In order to consider a country inside my sample, there
must be at least 20 consecutive years of observations. There are 122 countries
that meet this criteria.
I classify my sample countries into four different groups: low income, mid-low
income, mid-high income, and high income countries. Table 1.1 shows all the
countries in the sample with its respective classification. I find 29 low income
countries, 32 mid-low income countries, 31 mid-high income countries, and 30
high income countries. This classification is consistent and resembles significantly
the one done by the World Bank.
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Table 1.1: Sample classification of countries by income
Low Income Mid-Low Income Mid-High Income High Income
Bangladesh Mozambique Albania Honduras Argentina Lebanon Australia Israel
Benin Nicaragua Algeria Indonesia Botswana Lithuania Austria Italy
Burkina Faso Pakistan Armenia Jordan Brazil Malaysia The Bahamas Japan
Cambodia Rwanda Azerbaijan Macedonia Bulgaria Mauritius Belgium Luxembourg
Cameroon Senegal Belarus Morocco Chile Mexico Brunei Macao
Congo Dem. Sierra Leone Belize Namibia Colombia Panama Canada Netherlands
Gambia Sudan Bolivia Nigeria Costa Rica Poland Cyprus New Zealand
Haiti Tajikistan Congo Rep. Paraguay Croatia Portugal Denmark Norway
India Tanzania Cuba Peru Czech Rep. Romania Finland Singapore
Kenya Togo Dominican Rep. Philippines Estonia Russia France Slovenia
Kyrgyz Rep. Uganda Ecuador Serbia Gabon Slovak Rep. Germany Spain
Madagascar Uzbekistan Egypt Sri Lanka Hungary South Africa Greece Sweden
Mali Vietnam El Salvador Thailand Iran Turkey Hong Kong Switzerland
Mauritania Zimbawe Eq. Guinea Tunisia Kazakhstan Uruguay Iceland United Kingdom
Moldova Eswatini Ukraine Korea Venezuela Ireland United States
Guatemala West Bank Gaza Latvia
Note: To do the classification I use GDP-per-capita in constant 2010 US dollars from WDI
database. Every year I compute the quartiles with respect of this series and establish these
values as the limits between each one of the groups defined above. I then label each country
depending which group dominated the most throughout the years of the sample.
The prevalent practice is to define terms of trade as the percentage ratio of
unit value indexes of exports over imports. The WDI trade-weights these world
price indexes specifically for every single country. I deviate from this and use
another common characterization of terms of trade. I follow the definition of
terms of trade as the ratio of price deflators between imports and exports. This
is, for every year, I construct the series as
pt ≡ M
current
t /M
constant
t
Xcurrentt /X
constant
t
,
where M it stands for imports and X it for exports in year t at local currency units
where i represent current and constant prices.
The narrative of terms of trade is that small open economies are too small
11
to offset the aggregate world supply and demand of the product they trade. In
other words, small open economies take as given international prices. Under that
narrative, it is common to assume that terms of trade shocks of every country
follow an AR(1) process independent from its macroeconomic indicators. To
obtain the terms of trade shocks, I take an HP-filter with a smoothing parameter
of 100 to its log-series. Let p˜t represent the residuals between the original log-
series and its trend. I consider the following process for terms of trade in every
country
p˜t+1 = ρpp˜t + σpεt+1, where ε ∼ N(0, 1).
Table 1.2 shows the average of the autoregressive analysis of terms of trade resid-
uals. The average autocorrelation for all the countries in our sample is 0.339.
For high income countries, terms of trade shock tend to be a bit more persistent
compared to mid-low and mid-high income countries. This value tells us that
terms of trade shocks die quickly. In the literature, a standard value for this
parameter is around 0.50. Using log-quadratic detrending recovers this value.
Another feature of the analysis is that the volatility of the terms of trade shocks
decreases as we move across groups with higher income. The volatility excluding
high income countries is around 7.57%, a standard deviation consistent with the
literature.
We now include other macroeconomic aggregate variables and see how terms
of trade correlates with them. Table 1.3 shows the log-series HP-filter residuals
using the same smoothing parameter as before. Let us start with how terms
of trade correlates with real GDP. For low income, mid-low income, and high
income countries, the correlation of real GDP is close to zero. Nevertheless, we
12
Table 1.2: Terms of trade residuals autorgressive analysis
Terms of Trade Low Mid-Low Mid-High High All
AR(1) Income Income Income Income Countries
ρp 0.291 0.322 0.339 0.404 0.339
σp 0.096 0.075 0.056 0.027 0.063
R2p 0.148 0.145 0.157 0.192 0.160
find a negative relationship of -0.164 for mid-high income countries. This value
is consistent with the latest studies done for emerging economies. In the other
hand, there is a small negative relationship of 0.016% for high income countries.
Another feature we find is that for high income countries, investment does not
correlate with investment series. Nevertheless, for the rest of the countries, there
is a marked negative relationship between these two variables.
Table 1.3: Terms of trade and macroeconomic indicators correlations
Correlations with Low Mid-Low Mid-High High All
Terms of Trade Income Income Income Income Countries
GDP -0.071 0.047 -0.164 -0.016 -0.050
C -0.141 -0.044 -0.244 -0.147 -0.143
I -0.261 -0.081 -0.218 -0.131 -0.170
NX -0.279 -0.362 -0.123 -0.175 -0.236
L 0.070 -0.069 -0.098 -0.104 -0.052
U -0.054 0.016 0.133 0.082 0.045
Figure 1.2 shows what in the data (1.1) represent for all the countries in
the sample. Realize that the variation among countries in how terms of trade
correlate real GDP and labor2 related variables is diverse. Focus in Panel 1.2(a)
2The variables I consider are employment-popluation ratio and unemployment rate. I con-
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and firstly realize that the variation between of terms of trade and real GDP.
This correlation is not nearby the averages we found in the statistics table. This
help us conclude that focusing in the averages among countries is misleading.
This aggregation issue becomes more evident when we analyze the correlation
between labor and terms of trade. Suggesting that this variation is close to zero
does not reflect the different type of effect different countries have. Finally, we
find that the relationship (1.1) is clear. How real GDP react to terms of trade
is highly linked in how labor react to terms of trade. In Panel 1.2(b) we see
the same how the correlation between terms of trade and real GDP is linked
with how unemployment reacts to terms of trade. As we expected from the
previous plot, the relationship flips. The correlation between terms of trade and
real GDP becomes more positive as the correlation between terms of trade and
unemployment increases.
1.3.1 Real Wage Rigidity
There are many ways to motivate a real wage rigidity. In Schmitt-Grohé and
Uribe (2016) they propose that in the presence of nominal rigidities, having a
PEGed currency or having rigidities in prices creates a real wage rigidity. I use
this narrative to illustrate two country experiences, Greece and Ecuador. Figure
1.3 shows the correlation between terms of trade and real GDP for these two
countries. Panel 1.3(a) shows the experience of Ecuador. In the year of 2000,
Ecuador sacrificed their monetary autonomy adopting the dollar as its national
currency. Before this experience, the correlation between terms of trade and
sider only variations over employment-population ratio and not hours worked due to data
restrictions.
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(b) Unemployment rate
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Figure 1.2: Relationship between terms of trade fluctuations, real GDP, and the
labor market
Note: The correlations for each country are from 1991 to 2017. Real GDP comes from the
WDI database in local currency at constant prices. The terms of trade series are constructed
as the ratio between imports and exports price deflators using the WDI database also. Em-
ployment is represented as the employment to 15+ population ratio, meanwhile unemployment
is represented by the unemployment rate modeled by the ILO database. All series are log
HP-filtered using a smoothing parameter of 100.
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real GDP was 0.112 while after it changed to -0.177. In the other hand, we
see in Panel 1.3(b) what occurred to Greece. Greece the year 2000 entered the
European monetary union. In this way they sacrificed their monetary autonomy
by adopting the euro. Before this, the correlation between terms of trade and
real GDP was 0.366, while after it moved to -0.408. Both examples experienced
a deep change in the direction of how their economies reacted to terms of trade
changes.
(a) Ecuador
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Figure 1.3: Ecuador and Greece correlation between terms of trade and real
GDP
1.4 Model
I study a real business cycle model where a small open economy model is
subject to exogenous terms of trade shocks. In the economy, there is only one firm
producing final tradable goods. The final good firm imports foreign intermediate
inputs paying a terms of trade price.
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1.4.1 Households
Households’ preferences over consumption are given by
E0
[ ∞∑
t=0
βt u(ct, lt)
]
, (1.2)
where u(·, ·) is the period utility function, ct denotes private consumption in pe-
riod t, lt denotes the amount of hours supplied to work in period t, β ∈ (0, 1)
is the subjective discount factor, and E0 denotes the expectation operator con-
ditional on the information set available at time 0. The period utility function
u(·, ·) satisfy INADA conditons with respect of consumption, and with respect of
labor it is only strictly decreasing.
Households have the option every period in investing in capital stock. The
capital accumulation law of motion follows the rule
kt+1 = xt + (1− δ)kt, (1.3)
where xt represent the investment incurred in period t, kt the capital stock accrued
up to period t, and δ ∈ (0, 1) the depreciation rate of capital.
Each period, households spend ct in final consumption and xt in investment.
Households’ labor income is wtlt, where wt is the real wage in period t. Also,
households’ capital income is rtkt where rt is the real return to capital payment.
In addition, households’ receive the profits from the representative firm pit. Fi-
nally, Φ (·) represent an adjustment cost function penalizing changes in capital.
This capital adjustment cost function is a non-negative, increasing, and convex
function, where Φ(0) = 0. Considering all these, the households’ budget con-
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straint in terms of final goods is therefore given by
ct + xt + Φ (kt+1 − kt) = wtlt + rtkt + pit. (1.4)
The households’ problem consists of choosing final consumption goods, invest-
ment, labor supply, and capital stock {ct, xt, lt, kt+1}∞t=0 to maximize (1.2) given
the sequence of prices {wt, rt}∞t=0, profits {pit}∞t=0 and an initial capital stock
k0 > 0; subject to (1.3) and (1.4). In other words, the households’ problem can
be expressed as
Max
{ct,xt,lt,kt+1}∞t=0
{
E0
[ ∞∑
t=0
βtu (ct, lt)
]}
s.t. ct + xt + Φ (kt+1 − kt) ≤ wtlt + rtkt + pit
kt+1 ≤ xt + (1− δ)kt
ct, xt, lt, kt+1 ≥ 0
The optimality conditions of this problem are denoted by the following intertem-
poral and intratemporal conditions,
βEt
[(
uc (ct+1, lt+1)
uc (ct, lt)
)(
(1− δ) + rt+1 + Φ′ (kt+2 − kt+1)
1 + Φ′ (kt+1 − kt)
)]
= 1 (1.5)
ul (ct, lt)
uc (ct, lt)
= wt. (1.6)
1.4.2 Representative Final Good Firm
There is a representative firm that produces a final good in the economy every
period t. To produce this good, the firm hires labor Lt at a real wage cost wt, rents
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capital from the households Kt at a cost rt, and buys foreign intermediate inputs
at a terms of trade price pt. The technology of the firm will be characterized by a
production function F (·, ·, ·) that satisfies INADA conditions with a productivity
zt. Therefore, the period-by-period profit maximization problem can be described
as
pit = Max
Yt,Kt,Lt,Mt
{Yt − wtLt − rtKt − ptMt}
s.t. YF,t ≤ ztF (Kt, Lt,Mt)
Yt, Lt, Kt,Mt ≥ 0
The representative firm’s optimality conditions can be described as
ztFK (kt, Lt,Mt) = rt (1.7)
ztFL (kt, Lt,Mt) = wt (1.8)
ztFM (kt, Lt,Mt) = pt (1.9)
1.4.3 Labor Market & Unemployment
The labor market will feature a real wage floor w ∈ R+ that must be satisfied
every period. This real wage floor will allow an excess supply of labor making
involuntary unemployment exist in equilibrium. This real wage floor has been
motivated in Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe (2016), where they explain that a pres-
ence of a downward nominal wage rigidity and a monetary policy aimed not to
achieve full-employment can yield a real wage floor in the economy. Regarding
the amount of labor exchanged in the economy, it must follow that the amount of
labor demanded in the economy must not exceed its supply. In other words, the
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conditions wt ≥ w and lt ≥ Lt must be satisfied in every period t. Using these,
the labor market equilibrium implies that the following slackness condition must
hold for all periods,
(wt − w) (lt − Lt) = 0. (1.10)
This slackness condition joins both conditions assuring that the labor market will
experience full-employment only if the real wage is above the real wage floor.
1.4.4 Unemployment Mechanism
In Figure 1.4 I show a graphical represenation of how a negative shock in
the terms of trade can deliver different changes in the labor market. A negative
shock in the terms of trade can be seen as an increase in p. Because F (·, ·, ·)
satisfy INADA conditions, an increase in p imply a decrease in M by using (1.9).
Now, suppose we start with a terms of trade p0 and capital level K0. In that
sense, we start in the equilibrium A, with labor L0 and real wages w0. Now,
imagine there is an increase in terms of trade p1 > p0, implying a decrease in
intermediate foreign inputs M1 < M0 and in consumption for the households
c1 < c0. This movement makes the supply of labor increase and the demand of
labor decrease. Thus we reach the new equilibrium B with labor L1 and real wage
w1. Nevertheless, if the new wage is below real wage floor w > 0, equilibrium B
will not be achieved because the real wage is too low. In this case, the economy
will move to equilibrium C with labor L2 and real wage w2. Realise that in this
case the real wage in equilibrium will be the floor w2 = w and with this wage
the households are willing to supply labor L3. This discrepancy between the
supply and demand of labor yields unemployment L3 − L2 in equilibrium. The
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important feauture of the model is that the presence of the real wage rigidity
yields two different movements in labor when the real wage constraint is binding
or not. If the real wage constraint is not binding, then an increase in the terms
of trade will yield an increase in labor. Nonetheless, if the real wage constraint
binds with the change of the terms of trade, labor will decrease in equilibrium.
These opposite movements in labor affect the movements in real GDP producing
the two different movements in real GDP when terms of trade changes.
1.4.5 Recursive Characterization
To solve the decentralized equilibrium, I consider the recursive form of the
economy. To set the problem, it is necessary to divide the aggregate and individ-
ual states in the economy. The aggregate states are the total amount of capital
stock accumulated in the economy K, the terms of trade shock p, and the pro-
ductivity shock z. For tractability, define the state s = (K, p, z) as the aggreate
states in the economy.
The households are unable to see how their individual decisions affect the equi-
librium prices or the aggregate states of the economy. Therefore, the households
need to consider an individual state of capital stock in the economy k. Moreover,
the optimal investment decision will imply a future individual capital stock k′.
To find this stock, the households need to forecast the aggregate states in the
economy. The terms of trade shock is assumed to follow an exogenous stochastic
process. The aggregate capital is forecasted next period with the aggregate pol-
icy K(s) under rational expectations. In addition, the households need to also
forecast what is the current level of aggregate labor available in the economy.
The aggregate labor available is currently forecasted with the aggregate policy
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L(s) under rational expectations. This aggregate level of labor in the economy
will work as an upper boundary for what the household is able to supply of labor.
With this, the maximization problem of the households can be expressed as
V (k, s) = Max
c,x,l,k′
{u (c, l) + βE [V (k′, s′)]} (1.11)
s.t. c+ x+ Φ (k′ − k) ≤ w(s)l + r(s)k + pi(s)
k′ ≤ x+ (1− δ)k
K ′ = K(s)
l ≤ L(s)
c, x, l, k′ ≥ 0
The solution of the households’ problem will yield a policy rule for consumption
cˆ(k, s), labor lˆ(k, s), investment xˆ(k, s), and future capital stock kˆ(k, s).
Definition 1 (Decentralized Recursive Competitive Equilibrium) A de-
centralized recursive competitive equilibrium with real wage rigidity w is defined
as a value function {V (k, s)}, a set of price policies {w(s), r(s)}, households’
policies
{
kˆ (k, s) , lˆ (k, s) , xˆ (k, s) , cˆ (k, s)
}
, households’ desired labor supply policy
{hˆ(s)}, firm policies
{
Kˆ (s) , Lˆ (s) , Mˆ (s) , Yˆ (s) , pˆi(s)
}
, and the rational expecta-
tions policies {K(s),L(s)}; such that the following conditions are satisfied:
1. Taking the aggregate state s = (K, p, z) and the price policies {w(s), r(s)},
the profits policy {pi(s)}, and the aggregate forecast policies {K(s),L(s)} as
given; the value function {V (k, s)} and the households policies{
kˆ (k, s) , lˆ (k, s) , xˆ (k, s) , cˆ (k, s)
}
solve the problem (1.11).
2. Taking the aggregate state s = (K, p, z), the wage policy {w(s)}, and the
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consumption policy {cˆ(k, s)}; the households’ desired labor supply policy
{hˆ(s)} satisfies
w(s) =
ul
(
cˆ (K, s) , hˆ(s)
)
uc
(
cˆ (K, s) , hˆ(s)
)
3. Taking the aggregate state s = (K, p, z) and the aggregate labor forecast
policy {L(s)}, the price policies {w(s), r(s)} and the representative firms
policies
{
Mˆ(s), Yˆ (s), pˆi(s)
}
satisfy
w(s) = zFL
(
K,L(s), Mˆ(s)
)
r(s) = zFK
(
K,L(s), Mˆ(s)
)
p = zFM
(
K,L(s), Mˆ(s)
)
Yˆ (s) = zF
(
K,L(s), Mˆ(s)
)
pˆi(s) = Yˆ (s)− r(s)K − w(s)L(s)− pMˆ(s)
4. The goods market clear
Yˆ (s) = cˆ(K, s) + xˆ(K, s) + Φ (K(s)−K) + pMˆ(s)
5. The labor market clears
w(s) ≥ w, hˆ(s) ≥ L(s), and (w(s)− w)
(
hˆ(s)− L(s)
)
= 0
6. The rational expectations forecasts are consistent with private optimal deci-
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sion rules by the households
K(s) = kˆ(K, s) and L(s) = lˆ(K, s)
1.5 Quantitative Analysis
In this section, I pick the functional forms and values to the parameters of the
model. I solve the model numerically iterating over the optimal policy rules of
capital and labor satisfying the equilibrium conditions of the households, firms,
and market clearing. When solving for the optimal policy rules inside the grids,
I use a standard linear interpolation. Then I perform a quantitative analysis to
study how frictions in the labor market yield different reactions of macroeconomic
aggregates to terms of trade shocks.
1.5.1 Baseline Calibration
I calibrate the model taking standard parameters from the literature and
matching key moments in the data at an annual frequency for Greece from 1981
to 2017. I discretize the capital stock, the terms of trade, and the productivity
space into grids of 45, 21, and 15 elements, respectively. For the capital stock
grid, the elements are going to be equally separated with the steady state capital
stock at its center element. For the terms of trade and productivity grids, I follow
Tauchen and Hussey (1991) to obtain the probability transition matrix and the
elements of the grids for both AR(1) processes.
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Functional Forms. I use a separable utility function in consumption and la-
bor proposed in King, Plosser and Rebelo (1988). Using this utility function
consumption and leisure have different elasticities of substitution. The utility
function is
u(c, l) = c
1−γ
1− γ − χ
l1+ν
1 + ν ,
where χ > 0 measures the disutility of working, γ > −1 stands for the intertem-
poral elasticity of substitution for consumption, and ν > 0 a parameter that
determines the Frisch elasticity of labor supply.
The characterization of the capital adjustment cost function is broad in the
literature. I follow the specification proposed in Mendoza (1991)
Φ(k′ − k) = φ2 (k
′ − k)2 ,
where φ > 0 is a parameter that controls the penalty steepness of adjusting
capital stock. This penalty allows the model to control and match better the
investment fluctuations shown in the data.
I assume a Cobb-Douglas production function
F (K,L,M) = KαKLαLMαM ,
where αK , αL, αM ∈ (0, 1). Furthermore, I assume that the production function
has constant returns to scale, αK + αL + αM = 1.
Finally, I assume the log terms of trade and log productivity stochastic pro-
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cesses follow an AR(1) process each
ln (z′) = ρz ln(z) + σzεz and ln (p′) = ρp ln(p) + σpεp
where the auto-correlation parameter satisfy |ρz|< 0 and |ρp|< 0, and the shocks
are i.i.d. and normal distributed, εp, εz ∼ N(0, 1).
Model Parameters. Table 3.1 shows all the baseline calibration values for
the parameters of the model. I first specify some parameters using data directly
and standard values found in the literature. After, I calibrate the rest of the
parameters in two different ways. First, I calibrate the parameters such that the
steady state solution of the model follows well-known trends in the literature.
Then, I perform a Monte-Carlo simulation process and match common statistics
with the data. I collect 10,000 simulations of 2,500 periods each, ignoring the
first 500 periods to get rid of an initial state bias.
The first subset of parameters in Table 3.1 shows the characterization of the
parameters using data directly and standard values found in the literature. I
normalize the terms of trade base price index, the total labor supply of the house-
holds, and the production technology to 1. For the share of foreign intermediate
inputs αM , I use that the average of total imports as a share of GDP is 31%. For
the capital share αK , I use the standard value of 0.35 net of foreign intermediate
inputs. Finally, using the constant returns to scale assumption, the labor share
αL will be the residual of the two previous shares. Using the perpetual inventory
method explained in Conesa, Kehoe and Ruhl (2007), the depreciation rate of
capital stock satisfies that on average the consumption of fixed capital as a share
of GDP is of 10%. For the consumption intertemporal elasticity of substitution
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parameter, I set γ to the widely accepted value of 2. For the parameter of ν, I
fix a Frisch elasticity of substitution of 3.5. This value falls in the range of Frisch
elasticities used in macro models. For the terms of trade stochastic process, I
use log-quadratic filter. I find that the log terms of trade shocks last around 2.4
years and have a standard deviation of 28%.
The second subset of parameters in Table 3.1 shows the parameters calibrated
using the steady state and a simulation process. I set the discount parameter β
so the average investment to GDP ratio is of 25% in the steady state. I fix χ
to match that only a third of total available labor is used in the steady state. I
calibrate the real wage rigidity such that the unemployment rate in the statistics
of the simulation process is of 7%. Finally, the parameter that controls the
capital stock adjustment penalty is set to match the ratio of volatilities between
investment and GDP in the perfectly flexible wages environment. The volatility
of investment is almost 3 times as big as the volatility of GDP.
Table 1.5 shows the long-run correlation statistics from the model using a
Monte-Carlo simulation process. First, let us focus in the first two columns
where I use the preferences I proposed above. I establish as the Benchmark the
economy with the real wage rigidity. In the other hand, the Perfectly Flexible
will describe the economy where there is no real wage constraint. The first row
reports the correlation between real GDP and terms of trade innovations. The
first takeaway is that in an economy where there is a wage rigidity the correlation
is negative. Nevertheless, allowing the real wages to adjust freely, the correlation
becomes positive. As explained before, how labor adjusts to the shocks in the
terms of trade play a significant role to explain the different reaction of real GDP. I
decompose the reaction of labor towards terms of trade into two components: how
real wages react towards terms of trade, and how labor reacts towards real wages.
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Table 1.4: Calibration table
Parameter Value Source
p0 1.000 Base price index (Normalization)
L 1.000 Total labor supply (Normalization)
z 1.000 Production technology (Normalization)
αM 0.239 Average imports to GDP ratio (M/GDP = 31.45)
αK 0.266 Capital share (αK = 0.35(1− αM))
αL 0.495 Labor share (αL = 1− αK − αM)
δ 0.076 Average cons. fixed capital to GDP ratio (CFC/GDP = 10.11%)
γ 2.000 Standard consumption elasticity of substitution
ν 0.286 Frisch elasticity of substitution (1/ν = 3.5)
ρp 0.585 Terms of trade shocks persistency (1/(1− ρ) = 2.41)
σp 0.118 Terms of trade shocks standard deviation (σ/(1− ρ) = 28.46%)
ρz 0.921 Productivity shocks persistency (Data)
σz 0.021 Productivity shocks standard deviation (Data)
β 0.969 Steady state imports to GDP ratio (xss/GDPss = 24.78%)
χ 22.790 Steady state labor (lss/L = 1/3)
w 0.389 Simulations unemployment rate (h− l = 7.25%)
φ 9.092 Flexible wages volatility ratio (σ(x)/σ(GDP ) = 2.84)
28
The former moves equally regardless of the wage rigidity. Nevertheless, the main
difference resides in how labor adjusts towards movements in the real wages.
When real wages are perfectly flexible, the wealth effect plays a significant role
to make agents increase their labor supply. Hence, countering the substitution
effect of making leisure more attractive. In the other hand, when the real wage
constraint is present, this increase in the labor supply will only result in an
increase in unemployment, not labor.
Table 1.5: Parameter Values
KPR Preferences GHH Preferences
Statistic Benchmark Perfectly Flexible Wage Rigidity Perfectly Flexible
ρ( ˆGDP, p) -0.386 0.098 -0.649 -0.253
ρ(cˆ, p) -0.864 -0.906 -0.877 -0.943
ρ(lˆ, p) -0.355 -0.061 -0.699 -0.991
ρ(lˆ, wˆ) 0.107 -0.012 0.161 1.000
ρ(wˆ, p) -0.958 -0.987 -0.973 -0.991
Table 1.5 last two columns show the same long-run correlation statistics using
another type of preferences. The preferences proposed in Greenwood, Hercowitz
and Huffman (1988) are widely used in the real business cycles literature because
it simplifies the equilibrium by eliminating the wealth effect. Using this type of
preferences make the correlation between terms of trade and real GDP negative
regardless of the real wage rigidity. This is a direct consequence of eliminating the
wealth effect in preferences. Even though this solves the Kehoe-Ruhl observation,
it will not be able to account for a positive correlation between terms of trade
and real GDP. This is a shortcoming by using these preferences because, as I
documented before, the correlation between terms of trade and real GDP shocks
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can take negative and positive values.
I also perform a short-term experiment to see how the correlations between
terms of trade and real GDP and labor interact. Figure 1.5 shows this relationship
with and without the real wage rigidity. The data shows that there is a positive
relationship between these correlations from Figure 1.2(a). The model without
a real wage rigidity shows almost no relationship whatsoever as shown in Figure
1.5(a). On the other hand, adding the friction in the labor market replicates what
the data shows, as shown in Figure 1.5(b). As the correlation between terms of
trade and labor increases, the correlation between terms of trade and real GDP
increases also. Most importantly, it is able to replicate the heterogeneity in the
responses from real GDP and employment due to fluctuations in the terms of
trade.
In addition, Figure 1.6 analyzes the responses to the unemployment rate in
the model. It is expected that in the flexible wages environment, there will be
no possible action in this dimension because full-employment is always achieved.
Recalling from Figure 1.2(a), there exists a negative relationship between the
responses of real GDP and unemployment rates to fluctuations in the terms of
trade in the data. Figure 1.6(a) shows that it is impossible to replicate the neg-
ative relationship shown in the data. On the other hand, Figure 1.6(b) is able to
replicate the heterogeneity and relationship that the responses of unemployment
and real GDP have in the data.
1.6 Conclusion
In this paper, I argue that a terms of trade deterioration can affect positively
and negatively real GDP. I document that the business cycles correlation between
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terms of trade and real GDP vary widely between positive and negative values
across 122 countries. Furthermore, this variation still persists after separating
the countries into different income groups. I show evidence that how countries
react towards terms of trade movements is tightly linked to their labor market.
Specifically, when unemployment reacts positively to increases in the terms of
trade, real GDP will react negatively. In addition, when employment reacts
negatively to increases in the terms of trade, real GDP will also react negatively.
I construct a real business cycle model with terms of trade and productivity
uncertainty and a friction in the labor market. I find that a friction in the labor
market as a real wage floor can produce a different response in macroeconomic
aggregates to fluctuations in the terms of trade. In particular, when the wage
rigidity is not binding, a deterioration in the terms of trade produces an increase
to real GDP and employment. On the other hand, when the wage constraint
binds, unemployment must increase to stop the fall in real wages when there is
a deterioration in the terms of trade. This is, employment and real GDP fall to
keep real wages on the real wage floor level.
Finally, I due a simulation experiment of the model and analyze the results
under a perfectly flexible wages and under a real wage floor. I find that under
no frictions in the labor market, it is not possible to replicate the heterogeneity
in the responses of real GDP, employment and unemployment rates to terms
of trade fluctuations. On the other hand, when there are frictions in the labor
market, the model is able to replicate the features in the data.
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Figure 1.4: Representation of a negative terms of trade shock
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(a) Perfectly flexible wages
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(b) Real wage rigidity
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Figure 1.5: Relationship between correlation of real GDP and terms of trade
residuals and correlation of employment and terms of trade
Note: The simulation process was done taking 5,000 collections of 40 periods each. Using an
HP-filter with smoothing parameter of 100, the statistics are using a standard average across
period collections from trend deviations.
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(a) Perfectly flexible wages
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(b) Real wage rigidity
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Figure 1.6: Relationship between correlation of real GDP and terms of trade
residuals and correlation of unemployment rates and terms of trade
Note: The simulation process was done taking 5,000 collections of 40 periods each. Using an
HP-filter with smoothing parameter of 100, the statistics are using a standard average across
period collections from trend deviations.
Chapter 2
Sovereign spread movements in
emerging economies: terms of
trade matter
2.1 Introduction
This paper focuses on the high mean and volatility of interest rate spreads in
emerging economies. We document that some emerging economies experience a
decrease in the negative correlation between real GDP and interest rate spreads
for the last two decades. As a matter of fact, it is observed in the data that
interest rates oscillates regardless of a favorable domestic economic performance.
Figure 2.1 shows the Mexican interest rate spread for the last twenty years and
its relationship with real GDP and terms of trade. The interest rate spread in
Mexico displays sharp rises in 1998 and 2014, even though the economy does
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not experience deep recessions during these years. Moreover, during these years,
the interest rate spread in Mexico follow more closely the movements of the
terms of trade series. This observation corresponds to the puzzle proposed in
Tomz and Wright (2007). They found that the negative correlation between
output and default of a country is remarkably week. Also, they show evidence
of countries defaulting on their sovereign debts during good times while making
repayments during bad times. This paper addresses this puzzle by arguing that
foreign conditions can explain this issue.
Figure 2.1: Spreads and Cyclical Components in Mexico
The framework presented in Eaton and Gersovitz (1981) is beneficial to ana-
lyze the spread behavior because this class of model is able to derive the interest
rates endogenously 1. However, it has been proven difficult to obtain three fea-
1Aguiar and Gopinath (2007) and Neumeyer and Perri (2005) assume exogenous interest
rates since it is useful to explain business cycles of developing countries. High volatility and
countercyclicality of interest rates are regarded as crucial parts to explain the cyclical movement
of aggregate output and prices.
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tures of the interest rates with sovereign default models. Arellano (2008) shows
countercyclical interest rate spreads by introducing convex costs of default. This
yields defaults to be more likely to occur during recessions. Nevertheless, the
mean spread that the model provides is 3.58% which is relatively low compared
to the mean spread of Argentina, which is 10.25%. Also, only few fluctuations of
spread are observed with good economic conditions due to the structural features
of the probability of default. In fact, the spread generated by the model is al-
most zero when the country is hit by good endowment shocks. Mendoza and Yue
(2011) achieve large volatility of spread in their baseline model by introducing
endogenous default costs, but fail also to capture the high mean spread shown
in the data. This is because spread and default probabilities are linked to each
other directly. Hatchondo and Martinez (2009) and Chatterjee and Eyigungor
(2012) are able to improve the spread behavior in the sovereign default models
by incorporating long-duration bonds. This helps to increase mean and standard
deviation of spread; however, those studies cannot explain why spreads can be
high during good times in the economy. The high volatility of spreads is mainly
accomplished by the large dispersion of spreads with low endowments while the
standard deviation with high endowments is significantly small.
This paper proposes a stochastic general equilibrium model of sovereign de-
fault with endogenous default risk in order to explain the interest rate behavior
in emerging economies. The key feature of this paper is that the model incorpo-
rate an exogenous foreign shock called terms of trade. In the model, a negative
terms of trade shock act in two ways. First, the country spends more in foreign
products for consumption. Second, the terms of trade have direct impacts on the
level of foreign currency debts that sovereigns owe to foreign lender. This model
works with the assumption that sovereigns issue their bonds in foreign prices.
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As shown in Eichengreen and Hausmann (1999) and Jeanne (2003), emerging
economies tend to issue debt in foreign currency because their local currency
present high fluctuations and lack of credibility 2 Since debt is issued in for-
eign currency, the countries are vulnerable to changes in world prices. In other
words, when the adverse terms of trade shocks hit the economy, the sovereign
immediately encounters an unexpected enlarged debt burden. Consequently, the
probability of default is not only affected by countries GDP shocks but also the
terms of trade shocks. This provides an explanation of why terms of trade shocks
can lead to higher and more volatile spread movements, regardless of the GDP
performance.
As mentioned above developing countries experience high volatility of terms
of trade and output. More specifically, terms of trade shocks are more volatile
than GDP shocks in emerging economies. This implies that the terms of trade
shocks are an important factor to consider when studying them. Moreover, as
shown in Kose (2002) an important source for the repayment of foreign debt
is export revenue and this is largely affected by the terms of trade. Terms of
trade are often studied in the sovereign default models. Na, Schmitt-Grohé,
Uribe and Yue (2014), Gu (2015), and Asonuma (2016) endogenously induce the
deterioration of the terms of trade and real exchange rate. This paper make
distinctions from those papers by assuming terms of trade shocks as exogenous.
Popov and Popov, Wiczer et al. (2014) assume an exogenous path of terms of
trade but he examines the role of terms of trade penalties and focuses on changes
in trade volumes. In contrast, we focus in analyzing the changes in debt burden
contingent to terms of trade. Cuadra and Sapriza (2006) study also an exogenous
2Du and Schreger (2015) show that foreign currency debt composition has decreased since
2004. Nevertheless, they still have a significant level of foreign currency debt.
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terms of trade shock when the production side buy intermediate imported goods.
In their model, the terms of trade shocks are used as if they are productivity
shocks so the terms of trade shocks generate real GDP movement. However, this
mechanism violates the result in Kehoe and Ruhl (2008) that proves that terms
of trade do not have first order effects in real GDP3. Moreover, they do not have
the convex default costs so the frequency of default generated by the model is
unusually small. In this paper we involve both endowment shocks and the terms
of trade shocks, while also considering a convex default cost.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 empirical evidence,
Section 3 the model, Section 4 quantitative analysis, Section 5 conclusion.
2.2 Empirical evidence
2.2.1 Currency composition of sovereign external debt
In this section, we construct the ratio of foreign currency sovereign external
debt to total debt in developing countries. This helps to develop the idea that
the terms of trade shocks are of importance to the fluctuations of the economy in
emerging economies via foreign currency sovereign debt owed to foreign investors.
The definition of external debt is adopted from Du and Schreger (2015). We
deviate from their methodology because we are only interested in studying the
government debt4. Hence, we use the definition of sovereign external debt as any
3They also show that the terms of trade do not act as a productivity shock in standard
models while they do affect real income and consumption in a country.
4Their definition of external debt includes both public and private debt in order to analyze
how default decisions are affected by debt denomination in public and private sectors. However,
this paper considers only public debt. Thus, we define sovereign external debt instead of external
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debt issued by the government in developing countries and owed to nonresidents,
regardless of the market of issuance.
Debt is categorized by three dimensions: issue sector, issue currency, and is-
sue market. Issuance sector is divided into the government and the corporate
sector. The debt issued by the central or local governments is counted as gov-
ernment debt while all debt issued by the private sector is regarded as corporate
debt. The classification of issue currency is determined by which currency debt is
denominated when issued. Local currency (LC) debt refers to debt that is issued
in the currency of issuance country while foreign currency (FC) debt is denomi-
nated in another country’s currency. Lastly, issuance market is broken down into
two markets. When debt is issued under the domestic law inside a country, it is
called domestic debt; on the other hand, international debt follows foreign law
and issued in international markets. Among these categories, this paper mainly
address the combined category of government as issuer sector, foreign currency
as issue currency, and both markets as issue market in order to study sovereign
external debt.
Bank for International Settlements (BIS) provides amount of outstanding debt
data by each classification. However, debt data by debt holder - nonresidents or
residents -, which is the main part of definition of external debt, are not available.
Hence, we follow Du and Schreger (2015) to construct the currency composition of
sovereign external debt. They make two assumptions for debt holding of nonres-
idents. First, nonresidents hold all debts in international market, which implies
that all international debts are regarded as external debt. Second, nonresidents
do not hold any FC debt in domestic market5. Based on these two assumptions,
debt.
5They document that the amount of outstanding foreign currency debt in domestic market
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the FC sovereign external debt is constructed as follows: amount of outstanding
FC debt issued by the government in international market.
Table 2.1 provides the share of FC sovereign external debt in total sovereign
debt. The total sovereign debt is defined as all debts issued by the government so
it consists of both domestic debt and external debt. 6 The analysis of this paper
is proceed based on sovereign external debt, and it is expected that countries with
higher share of external debt denominated in FC are more likely to be exposed
by terms of trade shocks. In Table 2.1, although the substantial heterogeneity for
the ratio of FC external debt to total debt is observed, it is sensible that countries
are considerably under the influence of it. Moreover, there are some countries
that heavily rely on FC debt owed to foreign creditors such as Peru, Argentina,
Lebanon, and Lithuania. In particular, the countries that experienced sovereign
default events have a tendency to have higher percentage of FC external debt.
Argentina had carried on more than 75% of external debt in FC until the default
periods and reduced it to approximately 50% in the first half of the 2000’s. Peru
also has been maintained high share of FC external debt on average. In case of
Russia, almost half of the total debt is FC debt owed to nonresidents in 2004
which is significantly large enough to be affected by exchange rate movements.
One of the results from Du and Schreger (2015) is that sovereigns have been
using more LC when issuing external debt in government sector so there is a
tendency of the decrease in the proportion of FC external debt in total external
debt7. Nevertheless, analyzing FC external debt is worthy. Since they compare
is notably small so the second assumption is sensible.
6The definition of domestic debt in this context is any debt owed to residents within the
country.
7They analyze FC external debtTotal external debt while this paper analyze
FC external debt
External debt+Internal debt .
Thus the share of foreign currency external debt in this paper is affect by the amount of debt
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Table 2.1: Foreign Currency Debt Composition
Average 2004 2015
Argentina∗ 79.6 74.9 43.4
Brazil 7.3 4.9 4.4
Chile 12.9 20.8 16.3
Colombia 22.8 22.8 25.5
Croatia 45.7 59.3 46.1
Hungary 22.7 19.8 27.0
Indonesia 13.9 3.2 30.8
Lebanon 35.2 51.5 44.8
Lithuania 83.8 73.2 79.5
Malaysia 3.9 9.0 3.3
Mexico 16.2 27.3 15.1
Peru∗ 65.1 84.2 38.7
Philippines 24.9 33.9 23.4
Russia∗ 31.2 48.5 38.1
South Africa 7.2 10.6 9.7
Turkey 19.0 16.5 29.6
Notes: * indicates countries that experienced default events. 2005 data is used for Mexico and
Malaysia for the 2004 column and 2007 data and 2008 data are used for South Africa and
chile for the 2004 column respectively. They are first year of data availability.
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the FC external debt with total external debt, the expansion or contraction of the
amount of total external debt is not taken into consideration in their construction
of currency composition. In other words, the importance of FC external debt
could be underestimated if the countries issue more external debt than domestic
debt. However, the measure of currency composition used in this paper reflects
this issue since the definition of total sovereign debt include both domestic debt
and external debt. If the amount of domestic debt gets smaller, then the share
of FC external debt in total sovereign debt increases which means external debt
in FC becomes a more essential part of the debt in the countries. Actually, all
countries except Hungary and Russia in Table 2.1 display continuous increases in
the amount of external debt denominated in FC.8 Furthermore, it is not explicitly
shown that the share of FC external debt has been decreasing in Figure 2.2 with
our data construction. Indonesia, Hungary, Turkey, and Lithuania, for instance,
have kept expanding the share of external debt in FC. The LC debt in domestic
market rapidly rose in Croatia around 2004 so the share sharply decreased at
that time but it started to issue more FC debt in international market in 2009
so the share has been following the growing trend since the time. In addition,
other countries hold more or less a constant share of FC external debt. Those
empirical evidence illustrates that external debt in FC are still a crucial part of
debt in developing countries.
owe to residents in a country.
8Hungary and Russia has been reducing the amount of foreign currency external debt since
2014.
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Figure 2.2: Foreign Debt Profile for Emerging Economies
2.3 Terms of trade, GDP and spread across coun-
tries
The data presented in Table 2.2 and 2.3 are statistics for the terms of trade,
GDP, and spread across 24 developing countries. In this paper, the terms of trade
(TOT) are defined as the price of imports relative to the price of exports.
TOT = PM
PX
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In order to construct the terms of trade, quarterly merchandise customs imports
and exports data 1991Q1 to 2015Q4 are obtained from World Bank Global Eco-
nomic Monitor (GEM). 9 By using current and constant value of import and
export each deflator is calculated. Afterwards the import and the export defla-
tors are used for the price of imports and the price of exports respectively. Hence,
the terms of trade are constructed by import deflator over export deflator. The
quarterly GDP is also provided from GEM and the time period is the same as
the one in imports and exports data. The interest rate spread data are taken
from J.P. Morgan’s EMBI + database.10 The terms of trade and output are log
and HP detrended.
Table 2.2 provides standard deviation of the terms of trade, GPD, and spread.
It also provides the mean of spread in each country since this paper focuses on the
behavior of spread. Although there is a cross-country heterogeneity, in almost all
sample countries, the standard deviations of TOT is bigger than those of GDP. In
other words, TOT is more fluctuate than GDP in most of countries. This fact is
crucial for the analysis of the paper since this indicates that more fluctuations of
the economy can be driven by the terms of trade shocks with high volatility. Also,
defaulted countries, such as Argentina, Ecuador, and Russia, show much higher
mean and volatile movement of spread. In particular, the volatility of TOT in
Ecuador is approximately 14 times bigger than its GDP. Hence, it can be seen
that Ecuador has been affected by volatile terms of trade shocks. However, it is
9World Development Indicators (WDI) provides imports and exports data across countries,
but this is annual data. Thus, we interpolate annual data to transform to quarterly data and
compare it with the quarterly merchandise customs imports and exports and we found that
those two series are coincided through the sample period.
10The spread data are not a balanced data across countries, so we used series of spread
available up to 2015Q4.
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unclear that the terms of trade shocks is a main factor for movement of spread
based on magnitude of standard deviation, but correlation with spread will help
to improve this issue.
Table 2.3 shows different combinations of correlations among TOT, GDP and
spread in the sample countries. First, the negative correlations between GDP and
spread are achieved and also the positive correlations between TOT and spread
are presented in most countries. This implies that the deterioration of the terms
of trade coincide with the increase in spread in general. Moreover, even though
it is hard to find a certain pattern between ρ(TOT,spread) and ρ(TOT,spread),
there are nine countries having higher correlation of spread with TOT than with
GDP. This can be direct evidence for the impacts of TOT on movement of interest
rate spread. For example, Mexico have significantly high correlation of spread
with TOT while there is almost no correlation with GDP: hence, it is reasonable
to conclude that the the fluctuation of Mexican spread is mainly affected by the
terms of trade shocks. This interpretation can be generalize to any countries
showing higher correlation between spread and TOT.
2.4 Model
In this section, we propose a model of that incorporates two sources of uncer-
tainty in a country, a domestic and a foreign. We work with a framework that
extends the sovereign default models introduced in Eaton and Gersovitz (1981)
and Arellano (2008). We use this last one to incorporate a source of external
uncertainty called terms of trade.
Consider a small open economy where there are two types of shocks, a domes-
tic and a foreign. On one hand, the domestic shock is going to be represented by
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Table 2.2: Descriptive Statistics in Emerging Economies
σ(TOT) σ(GDP) σ(spread) µ(spread)
Argentina 0.045 0.040 18.24 15.99
Brazil 0.041 0.015 3.92 5.66
Chile 0.090 0.018 0.59 1.46
China 0.036 0.010 0.55 1.18
Colombia 0.073 0.013 2.07 3.56
Dominican Rep 0.022 0.023 3.30 5.39
Ecuador 0.295 0.020 8.38 12.33
Egypt 0.034 0.015 1.74 2.55
Hungary 0.016 0.015 1.58 1.80
Indonesia 0.068 0.033 1.44 2.89
Kazakhstan 0.264 0.024 2.74 4.28
Korea 0.035 0.023 1.04 1.31
Malaysia 0.027 0.018 1.25 1.78
Mexico 0.040 0.023 1.51 2.75
Morocco 0.016 0.013 2.43 2.30
Peru 0.073 0.018 1.96 3.51
Philippines 0.046 0.013 1.52 3.46
Poland 0.096 0.014 0.90 1.71
Russia 0.098 0.029 11.26 7.28
South Africa 0.032 0.012 1.19 2.26
Sri Lanka 0.024 0.009 4.33 6.01
Tunisia 0.014 0.011 0.92 1.84
Turkey 0.030 0.036 2.20 4.02
Ukraine 0.023 0.043 6.23 7.46
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Table 2.3: Correlations in Emerging Economies
ρ(TOT,spread) ρ(GDP,spread) ρ(TOT,GDP)
Argentina -0.026 -0.647 -0.066
Brazil 0.205 -0.198 -0.553
Chile 0.528 -0.335 -0.478
China -0.080 -0.007 0.257
Colombia 0.267 -0.197 -0.485
Dominican Rep 0.020 -0.641 -0.006
Ecuador 0.517 -0.445 -0.687
Egypt 0.082 -0.189 0.084
Hungary 0.141 -0.290 0.222
Indonesia 0.574 -0.284 -0.507
Kazakhstan -0.440 -0.607 0.541
Korea -0.209 -0.633 0.524
Malaysia 0.061 -0.485 0.116
Mexico 0.443 0.005 -0.466
Morocco -0.126 0.135 -0.099
Peru 0.332 -0.156 -0.263
Philippines 0.029 -0.326 0.262
Poland 0.007 0.159 0.137
Russia 0.241 -0.487 -0.681
South Africa 0.223 -0.250 -0.021
Sri Lanka 0.433 -0.430 0.229
Tunisia 0.556 -0.162 0.017
Turkey 0.169 -0.449 0.079
Ukraine -0.194 -0.423 -0.157
48
real GDP movements. On the other, the foreign shock is going to be represented
by terms of trade movements. Let yt and pt represent output and terms of trade
in period t, respectively. As discussed previously, it is standard to assume terms
of trade as an exogenous variable for small open economies. We consider this in
order to construct the following stochastic system
ln yt+1
ln pt+1
 = A
ln yt
ln pt
+
εyt+1
εpt+1
 , (2.1)
where the roots of the second order polynomial det (I2 − Ax) = 0 lie outside the
complex unit circle and the errors vector is a binormal distribution with mean 0
and variance-covariance matrix Σ. With this formulation we are able to tailor a
correlation between contemporanous real GDP and terms of trade.11
There are two types of tradable goods in this economy, a domestic and a
foreign. In every period, a representative household purchases these two types
of goods and transfom them into a final consumption good using the following
Armington aggregator technology,
C =
(
λc−ηd + (1− λ)c−ηf
)− 1
η ,
where C represents the final aggregated good consumption, cd the domestic good
consumption, cf the foreign good consumption, λ ∈ [0, 1] a parameter that cap-
tures home bias, and η ∈ [−1,∞) a parameter that controls the elasticity of
11As shown in Kehoe and Ruhl (2008), it is a common mistake to misrepresent what real
GDP is in a model. Moreover, standard models with a production side that buy imported goods
at the price of terms of trade capture a spurious correlation between real GDP and terms of
trade. If real GDP is measured correctly in them, the correlation between real GDP and terms
of trade should be close to zero.
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substitution between domestic and foreign goods. The representative household
is able to purchase these goods taking the output available in the period and
an amount of taxes that the government issues in a lump-sum fashion as given.
The representative household is a risk averse agent that obtains utility from the
stream of final consumption goods obtained in every period as
E0
[ ∞∑
t=0
βtu (Ct)
]
,
where β ∈ (0, 1) is a parameter that captures a discount factor across periods
and u(·) is an increasing and strictly concave function.
In this economy there is also a benevolent government whose objective is to
maximize the utility of the representative household. In order to achieve this, it
has two main decisions to take. The first decision is either to honor or default in
its sovereign bonds obligations. If the government takes the decision of honoring
them, it has access to international financial markets where it can buy or sell
one period maturity sovereign bonds. Then, the second decision is how much of
these bonds to purchase given a price schedule contingent to the amount of these
new bonds and the shocks the economy experiences. Let B, B′, and q(B′, y, p)
represent the amount of sovereign bonds due, the amount of new sovereign bonds
purchases, and the price of these at any given period.
We introduce the assumption that the international financial markets are
managed only in foreign goods. This is, the sovereign bonds returns and purchases
have to be done in foreign terms. Because of this, the value of sovereign bonds
in each period will be subject to the terms of trade shock.
We model two types of penalties for defaulting in sovereign debt, exclusion of
financial markets and output losses. With these penalties we want to capture the
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fact that countries that default in their debt experience a temporary exclusion to
international borrowing and periods of poor output performance. We assume that
if a government defaults in their debt, this will be erase entirely and it will enter
a financial autarkic environment. In addition, the country will experience an
output cost that limit its endowment. The economy will remain in this financial
autarky for a stochastic number of periods and will re-enter the financial markets
with an exogenous probability.
Let x represent exports, the resources exiting the economy. The balance trade
condition for the repayment state can be expressed as
x− pcf = pq(B′, y, p)B′ − pB.
The left-hand side is the current account while the right-hand side is the negative
of the capital account of the economy. This is, any surplus(deficit) that the capital
account experiences due to the government’s sovereign debt position will imply
a deficit(surplus) of the current account. The balance trade condition for the
default state can be expressed as
x− pcf = 0.
Considering the exclusion of financial markets penalty of default, the balance
trade condition will imply that the current account cannot experience any kind
of suplus or deficit.
The resource constraint of the government will show how the domestic good
endowment can be consumed in every period. On one hand, if the government
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chooses to repay its debt, the resource constraint will be
cd + x = y.
On the other hand, if the government chooses to default,
cd + x = h(y),
where h(·) is an increasing function such that h(y) ≤ y12.
There is a representative foreign lender who is able to borrow and lend risk-
free bonds at a constant international interest rate r∗ > 0. We assume it has
perfect information about the small open economy. This is, it can observe the
level of output and terms of trade that the small open economy experiences
every period. The foreign lender is risk neutral13 and maximizes expected profits
over risky sovereign bonds from the small open economy. We assume that the
foreign lender maximizes profit only in foreign goods terms. Let δ represent the
probability of the government to default in its sovereign debt position. Taking
as given the default probability and the bond price, the foreign creditor chooses
B˜′ to maximizes
Max
B˜′
{
qB˜′ −
(
1− δ
1 + r∗
)
B˜′
}
.
By the risk neutral nature of the foreign lender, the bond price schedule solu-
12Realise that the output cost is defined as y − h(y) and is non-negative by definition.
13Cole and Kehoe (1996) explains that the risk neutrality of the foreign lenders reflect the
fact that the size of an individual sovereign transaction is relatively small compared to the total
international credit market.
52
tion in equilibrium must satisfy the first order condition of the previous problem.
The bond price schedule will be a result of the following break-even condition,
q = 1− δ1 + r∗ . (2.2)
Realising that δ ∈ [0, 1], we can infer that q ∈
[
0, 11+r∗
]
. Defining the sovereign
interest rate as r ≡ 1
q
− 1, we obtain that r = [r∗,∞). Finally, we define the
sovereign bond spread as S ≡ r − r∗.
The timing of the government problem is the following. In the beginning
of the period the government realises the amount of sovereign bonds due B,
the domestic goods endowent shock y, and the terms of trade shock p. The
government asses the optimal relationship between domestic and foreign goods
using p and the preferences of the representative household. Then the government
decides whether to honor or default in its debt obigations. If it decides to honor its
debt, the government updates its sovereign bond holdeings B′ taking as given the
sovereign bond price schedule q(B′, y, p) and constrained to its resource constraint
and the balance trade condition. The foreign lender takes the bond price q as
given and supplies B˜′ matching B′. Purchases of foreign and domestic take place.
Finally, the representative household consumes the final good by aggregating the
domestic and foreign goods.
2.4.1 Recursive Equilibrium
There are three variables that define the state of the government in every
period: the sovereign bonds due, the output shock, and the terms of trade shock.
Define V (B, y, p) as the value function of the government at the beginning of
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every period. Let us model the first decision of the government as
V (B, y, p) = Max
{
V R(B, y, p), V D(y, p)
}
, (2.3)
where V R(B, y, p) and V D(y, p) represent the value of the government if it repays
and defaults in its debt obligations, respectively. Here, the government chooses
which environment will yield the highest welfare for the representative household
captured by V R(B, y, p) and V D(y, p).
When the government chooses to repay, it chooses the amount of sovereign
bonds to sell or purchase as well as the household allocations that will maximize
its welfare subject to the resource constraint, the balance trade condition, the
aggregation technology, and a no-Ponzi condition. In order to do this, it takes
the price schedule for the bonds as given and a lower boundary for the sovereign
bonds issuance B > 0. Thus,
V R(B, y, p) = Max
x,cd,cf ,C,B′
{
u(C) + βE(y′,p′) [V (B′, y′, p′)|(y, p)]
}
(2.4)
s.t. cd + x = y (Resource Constraint)
x− pcf = pq(B′, y, p)B′ − pB
(Balance Trade Condition)
C =
(
λc−ηd + (1− λ)c−ηf
)− 1
η (Aggregation Technology)
B′ ≥ −B. (No-Ponzi Condition)
When the government chooses to default, it chooses the household allocations
that will maximize its welfare subject to the resource constraint, the balance
trade condition, and the aggregation technology. In order to do this, it takes
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the default penaltiy and the probability of returning to the financial markets
φ ∈ [0, 1] as given. Recall that the default penalties are the output costs and the
zero current account restriction due to the financial market exclusion. Thus,
V D(y, p) = Max
x,cd,cf ,C
{
u(C) + βE(y′,p′)
[
φV (0, y′, p′) + (1− φ)V D(y′, p′)|(y, p)
]}
(2.5)
s.t. cd + x = h(y) (Resource Constraint)
x− pcf = 0 (Balance Trade Condition)
C =
(
λc−ηd + (1− λ)c−ηf
)− 1
η . (Aggregation Technology)
In order to define what is the probability of default for a government, it
is useful to characterize the set of output and terms of trade states in which
a government finds optimal to default contingent to a level of sovereign bond
holdings. Specifically, define the default set as the
D(B) =
{
(y, p) ∈ R2++ : V D(y, p) > V R(B, y, p)
}
. (2.6)
This set expresses that if the government sells B′ and the shocks of next period
are (y′, p′) ∈ D(B′), then the government will find it optimal to default on B′
next period. Because of this, we can define the probability for a government
to default on B′ by measuring how likely is to end up in the states that live in
D(B′). Given the stochastic process that govern the movements of output and
terms of trade shocks, call f(·) the probability density function between shock
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states. Thus, the probability of default can be expressed as
δ(B′, y, p) =
∫
(y′,p′)∈D(B′)
f ((y′, p′)|(y, p)) d(y′, p′). (2.7)
Consider the case where the government chooses a level of sovereign bonds B′
such that there are no possible states in the next period in which it will default on
them, D(B′) = ∅. Then, with that amount of sovereign bonds the probability of
default will be zero, δ(B′, y, p) = 0. Also, consider the case when the government
chooses a level of sovereign bonds B′ such that default is for sure regardless
of the shock realisations in the next period, D(B′) = R2++. Then, with that
amount of sovereign bonds the probability of default will be one, δ(B′, y, p) = 1.
Finally, realise that if the output and terms of trade shocks have no persistency
whatsoever, then the probability of default will only be contingent in the sovereign
bond issues or purchases.
Now, the bond price schedule must satisfy the break-even condition (2.2) from
the representative foreign lender problem. Considering the probability of default,
the representative foreign lender must be consistent to (2.7). Thus, the bond
price schedule will be
q(B′, y, p) = 1− δ(B
′, y, p)
1 + r∗ . (2.8)
Realise that this break-even condition will yield zero profit in expectation to
the representative foreign lender regardless of the quantity of sovereign bonds
it purchases or sells B˜′. Therefore, it will be willing to cover any amount of
sovereign bonds the government finds optimal to choose during the repayment
state. In other words, the sovereign bond market always clear in equilibrium
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B˜′ = B′.
Definition 2 (Recursive Equilibrium) The recursive equilibrium of this small
open economy will be a set of government value functions V (B, y, p), V R(B, y, p),
V D(y, p) and a sovereign bonds policy rule Bˆ′(B, y, p), a set of household con-
sumption policy rules cˆd(B, y, p), cˆf (B, y, p), and Cˆ(B, y, p), an exports policy
rule xˆ(B, y, p), a default set D(B, y, p), a default probability schedule δ(B, y, p),
and bond price schedule q(B, y, p) such that the following conditions are satisfied:
I Benevolent Government (Initial)
The default set D(B, y, p) is consistent with the set of government value
functions V (B, y, p), V R(B, y, p), and V D(y, p) and solves (2.3).
I Benevolent Government (Repayment)
If (y, p) /∈ D(B) and taking as given the bond price schedule q(B, y, p), the
government chooses the sovereign bonds policy rule Bˆ′(B, y, p), the set of
household consumption policy rules cˆd(B, y, p), cˆf (B, y, p), and Cˆ(B, y, p),
and the exports policy rule xˆ(B, y, p) in order to solve (2.4) and its solution
is consistent with V R(B, y, p).
I Benevolent Government (Default)
If (y, p) ∈ D(B), the government chooses the set of household consumption
policy rules cˆd(B, y, p), cˆf (B, y, p), and Cˆ(B, y, p), and the exports policy
rule xˆ(B, y, p) in order to solve (2.5) and its solution is consistent with
V D(y, p).
I Default probability
The default probability schedule δ(B, y, p) is consistent with the default set
D(B, y, p) and (2.7).
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I Bond Pricing
The bond pricing schedule q(B, y, p) is consistent with the probability of
default schedule δ(B, y, p) and (2.8).
2.4.2 Aggregate Recursive Equilibrium
The problem described in the previous section has an intratemporal condi-
tion between consumption of foreign and domestic goods by the representative
household. Specifically, this intratemporal condition balances the terms of trade
with the marginal rate of substitution between foreign and domestic consumption
goods,
p =
u′(C) · ∂C
∂cf
u′(C) · ∂C
∂cd
=
(
1− λ
λ
)(
cd
cf
)1+η
. (2.9)
Using the final consumption aggregator and (2.9), let us define the final con-
sumption price index as
P(p) ≡
(
λ
1
1+η + (1− λ) 11+η p η1+η
) 1+η
η
. (2.10)
This price lets us weight the price of the final consumption good in the economy
considering how important are domestic and foreign goods in its aggregation.
Notice that the limit expression of home bias follow,
lim
λ→0
{P(p)} = 1 and lim
λ→1
{P(p)} = p.
On one hand, if there is complete home bias, the price index of the final con-
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sumption good is not affected at all by the terms of trade. This result is intuitive
because it tells us that the representative household does not derive any utility
from foreign consumption goods. On the other hand, if there is complete foreign
bias, the price index of the final consumption good is the complete terms of trade
price.
Consider an aggregate version of the government’s problem when it chooses
to repay,
V R(B, y, p) = Max
C,B′
{
u(C) + βE(y′,p′) [V (B′, y′, p′)|(y, p)]
}
(2.11)
s.t. P(p)C + pq(B′, y, p) = y + pB (Resource Constraint)
B′ ≥ −B. (No-Ponzi Condition)
Also, consider the an aggregate version of the government’s problem when it
chooses to default,
V D(y, p) = Max
cd,cf ,C
{
u(C) + βE(y′,p′)
[
φV (0, y′, p′) + (1− φ)V D(y′, p′)|(y, p)
]}
(2.12)
s.t. P (p)C = h(y) (Resource Constraint)
Definition 3 (Aggregate Recursive Equilibrium) The aggregate recursive
equilibrium of this small open economy will be a set of government value functions
V (B, y, p), V R(B, y, p), V D(y, p) and a sovereign bonds policy rule Bˆ′(B, y, p), a
household final consumption policy rule Cˆ(B, y, p), a final consumption good price
index P(p), a default set D(B, y, p), a default probability schedule δ(B, y, p), and
bond price schedule q(B, y, p) such that the following conditions are satisfied:
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I Benevolent Government (Initial)
The default set D(B, y, p) is consistent with the set of government value
functions V (B, y, p), V R(B, y, p), and V D(y, p) and solves (2.3).
I Benevolent Government (Repayment)
If (y, p) /∈ D(B) and taking as given the bond price schedule q(B, y, p) and
the final consumption good price index P(p), the government chooses the
sovereign bonds policy rule Bˆ′(B, y, p) and the household final consumption
policy rule Cˆ(B, y, p) in order to solve (2.4) and its solution is consistent
with V R(B, y, p).
I Benevolent Government (Default)
If (y, p) ∈ D(B) and taking as given the final consumption good price in-
dex P(p), the government chooses household final consumption policy rules
Cˆ(B, y, p) in order to solve (2.5) and its solution is consistent with V D(y, p).
I Price Index
The final consumption good price index follows (2.10).
I Default probability
The default probability schedule δ(B, y, p) is consistent with the default set
D(B, y, p) and (2.7).
I Bond Pricing
The bond pricing schedule q(B, y, p) is consistent with the probability of
default schedule δ(B, y, p) and (2.8).
Proposition 4 (Recursive Equilibrium Isomorphism) The equilibriums de-
fined in Definition 2 and Definition 3 are isomorphic.
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Proof See Appendix 4.1.
This transformation of the original problem is very useful for solving the model
and to understand how terms of trade shocks work in our environment. Firstly,
realise that the final consumption good price index is non-decreasing14 in terms
of trade regardless of the parameters λ and η,
P ′(p) =
(
(1− λ)P (p)
p
) 1
1+η
≥ 0.
This implies that, regardless of the complementarity or substitutaility of the
domestic and foreign goods, the final consumption good price index will keep a
monotonic behaviour throughout all the domain of the terms of trade. Moreover,
the final consumption good price index will work as a shock absorber of the terms
of trade shock. This is, the households will only experience a fraction of the terms
of trade shock in terms of final good expenditure. Therefore, terms of trade will
have two main effects in the model. The first effect is adjsuting the price of
final consumption goods. The second effect is expanding or contracting the debt
burden of soverign bonds. This last effect is present under the assumption that
the sovereign government issues debt in foreign currency.
Proposition 5 (Default Sets Monotonicity) Pick an arbitrary level of
sovereign bonds B1 such that D(B1) 6= ∅, if B2 ≤ B1 then D(B1) ⊆ D(B2).
Proof See Appendix 4.1.
14Furthermore, it is strictly increasing as long as we assume there is no full home-bias in the
model λ ∈ [0, 1)
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This result is originally taken from Eaton and Gersovitz (1981), Arellano
(2008), and Chatterjee, Corbae, Nakajima and Rios-Rull (2007) and it is common
in sovereign default models. This result tells us that incentives are monotonic
with respect of sovereign bonds. Hence, it is mainly followed because the bond
pricing q(B′, y, p) is independent from the sovereign bonds due in a period. In
our model, this relationship does not exist because of the assumption of risk
neutrality from the representative foreign lender. Thus, given a level of output
and terms of trade, the sovereign bonds due in the period acts only as a shifter
in the available amount of resources in the economy. Therefore, if for a level of
sovereign bonds a government finds optimal to default, then for a lower level of
soverign bonds the default decision will still be optimal because the government
will have less resources overall.
Using Proposition 5 we can conclude that the bond pricing q(B, y, p) is non-
decreasing in sovereign bonds. Let us focus in the case where the government
borrows resources from foreign lenders. As the government increases the amount
of borrowing, the actual amount of resources received will decrease because the
bond pricing contracts. This resources reduction of borrowing compensates the
default probability that the government can incur in the following period.
2.4.3 No Persistency Case
Let us study the case in which the stochastic system proposed in (2.1) has no
persistency, therefore it is i.i.d. binormal distribution with mean 0 and variance-
covariance matrix Σ. In this case, the probability of default and the sovereign
bond price schedule lose their contingency with respect of GDP and terms of
trade. This is because current levels of GDP and TOT do not provide any
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information about the future realizations of them. We assume also that there are
no penalty costs, h(y) = y; and default is permanent, φ = 0.
Proposition 6 (No Resources Inflows) For every sovereign bonds B such that
D(B) 6= ∅, every feasible B′ will yield no resources inflows, q(B′)B′ −B ≥ 0.
Proof See Appendix 4.1.
Default episodes happen when governments are unable to roll-over their debt.
This idea is captured with Proposition 6. If the government is in a state where
he chooses to default, all the feasible issuances of sovereign bonds must have not
been enough to cover the sovereign bonds due in the period. Specifically, there
was no feasible issuances of sovereign bonds that could have given a positive flux
of resources from outside, B − q(B′)B′ ≯ 0.
Proposition 7 (GDP Default Incentives) Pick an arbitrary level of terms of
trade p and sovereign bonds B such that D(B) 6= ∅, if y2 ≤ y1 and (y1, p) ∈ D(B)
then (y2, p) ∈ D(B).
Proof See Appendix 4.1.
Default episodes also happen when economies experience recessions, periods
where GDP levels are below the trend. Proposition 7 is able to capture this
idea. This shows that there if a government finds optimal to default on a level of
sovereign bonds for a given recession, any deeper recession would make it default
as well. This result is driven mainly because the country will be poorer and there
are not contracts available that provide an influx of resources from abroad.
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Proposition 8 (Terms of Trade Default Incentives) Pick an arbitrary level
of GDP y and sovereign bonds B such that D(B) 6= ∅, if p2 ≥ p1 and (y, p1) ∈
D(B) then (y, p2) ∈ D(B).
Proof See Appendix 4.1.
We have a similar result for the case of terms of trade rising higher than the
trend. Proposition 8 is able to capture this idea. This shows that there if a
government finds optimal to default on a level of sovereign bonds for a level of
terms of trade, any higher level of terms of trade would make it default as well.
This result is driven mainly because the country will experience more expensive
goods from the exterior and the resources that flow outside the country will grow
because of the foreign good coversion.
2.5 Quantitative analysis
In this section, we study Mexico and its business cycles statistics. Also, we de-
scribe the calibration process of the model fitting the parameters to the Mexican
economy. We solve the aggregate recursive equilibrium described in Definition
3 applying a value function iteration process using a grid search method. The
complete algorithm can be found in Appendix 4.2.
2.5.1 Data
Let us study the Mexican business cycle behavior as an emerging economy.
Using OECD Statistics, we obtain quarterly data seasonally adjusted at quarterly
levels, and at current and constant prices from 1993Q1 to 2016Q2 for the series
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of gross domestic product, private final consumption expenditure, exports of goods
and services, and imports of goods and services. Also, using Global Financial
Database, we obtain quarterly data from 1997Q4 to 2016Q3 for the series of
Emerging Markets Bond Index (EMBI+). The series of EMBI+ is provided by
J.P. Morgan and portrays the long-term spread between yields from sovereign
bond and the U.S. Treasuries. We construct the terms of trade series as the ratio
of imports price delfator and exports price deflator following Kehoe and Ruhl
(2008) methodology15. We apply the HP-filter with a smoothing parameter of
1600 to the real consumption, real output and terms of trade log-series in order
to obtain the cyclical components of them. In addition, we compute the ratio of
the difference between exports and imports, over GDP to construct the series of
trade balance.
Table 2.4: Business Cycles Statistics for Mexico
Variable µ σ ρ(·,Spread) ρ(·,GDP) ρ(·,TOT)
Spread 2.71% 1.47% - 0.0352 0.2178
GDP - 2.22% 0.0352 - -0.4480
Terms of Trade - 2.56% 0.2178 -0.4480 -
Consumption - 2.65% -0.0367 0.9518 -0.4673
Trade Balance -0.84% 1.62% 0.3335 -0.4819 0.1501
Table 2.4 shows the business cycles statistics for the Mexican economy. The
table shows regular characteristics of emerging economies shown in Neumeyer and
15There are other ways to compute terms of trade. For example, Mendoza (1995) uses the
ratio of exports and imports volumes. We choose not to use this methodology for convenience.
Establishing terms of trade as the ratio of imports and exports deflator matches closely the
movements of real exchange rates.
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Perri (2005). The volatility of consumption is higher compared to the volatility of
GDP. Another important characteristic is that trade balance is countercyclical.
Nevertheless, we are not able to find that interest rates (captured by the sovereign
spread series) are countercyclical after 1997Q416.
Terms of trade also play an important feature. As documented in Mendoza
(1995), Kose (2002), and Broda (2004), there is a strong negative relationship
between terms of trade and real GDP in emerging countries. Also, the volatility
of terms of trade is higher compared to the volatility of GDP. An important
feature we are able to provide is that the correlation between terms of trade and
the spreads is significantly higher than the correlation between GDP and spreads.
This seems to suggest that the movements the Mexican experienced after 1997
may be better explained by movements in terms of trade rather than movements
in real GDP.
2.5.2 Calibration
We use the real GDP and terms of trade HP-filter log-series in order to esti-
mate (2.1). We assume that the errors vector components are independent from
each other17 and distributed as εyt+1 ∼ N(0, σ2y) and εyt+1 ∼ N(0, σ2y). We estimate
16We analyzed this issue further. We use the database provided by Neumeyer and Perri
(2005) and construct an implied EMBI+ series from 1994Q1 to 1997Q3. In the database
the authors provide the interest rate of several emerging economies from 1994Q1 to 2002Q2.
We take the series of Mexican interest rates and substract the yield of US 10-year Treasury
constant maturity. We find that the constucted EMBI+ series resembles closely the original
EMBI+ series in the quarters they overlap with the exception of the period 2001Q2-2002Q2.
Filling the missing quarters for the spread series we are able to find that the interest rates
(captured by the sovereign spread series) is countercyclical, with a correlation of -0.4275.
17We make this assumption for simplicity. Nevertheless, we are expecting in relaxing this.
The error of the real GDP regression surely is correlated with contemporanous terms of trade.
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the matrix A using standard OLS regressions18,
A =
 0.8399 −0.0291
−0.1466 0.5367
 .
Once estimated the matrix A, we recover the observed errors and estimate the
standard deviations of the errors. The standard deviations of the GDP and
terms of trade errors are σy = 0.0105 and σp = 0.0203, respectively. Finally,
we discretize the 2-dimensional VAR(1) process into a 289 Markov chain (17
GDP and 17 terms of trade shock levels) using a quadrature method algorithm
following Tauchen and Hussey (1991) with a 3 standard deviations mean centered
bandwidth.
We use a standard CRRA utility function to convey the representative house-
hold preferences,
u(C) = C
1−σ
1− σ ,
where σ represents the constant relative risk aversion parameter. We settle this
risk aversion parameter to the value of 2. This is a common value in the inter-
national real business cycles literature.
During default episodes we impose GDP penalty via the increasing function
h(·). An important issue to address when modeling this is its sensitivity con-
tingent to the state of the economy. We use Arellano (2008) convex GDP cost
In this way, the assumption of the errors being independent should be worked upon.
18We make this assumption to capture a higher correlation between contemporanous real
GDP and terms of trade. Terms of trade can be considered as exogenous for small open
economies as motivated in Broda (2004). Therefore, previous real GDP affecting contempora-
neous terms of trade should be restricted.
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formulation,
h(y) =
y if y ≤ κE[y]κE[y] if y > κE[y] ,
where κ > 0 is a contraction of the long-run mean of GDP. This formulation
has the advantage of making default less sensitive to GDP shocks. In particular,
defaulting with a GDP level below the threshold of κE[y] there is no GDP penalty.
Nevertheless, above this threshold the GDP penalty increases the higher GDP is.
We use the Global Financial Database in order to obtain the series of US
10-year Treasury constant maturity yield. We pick a 10-year Treasury maturity
bond because the EMBI+ series relies on long-term maturity bonds. We fix the
risk-free interest rate as the average yield from 1997Q1 to 2016Q3, which is 1.62%.
The literature show a wide variety of possible elasticity of substitution between
domestic and foreign goods. As noted by Ruhl (2008), this elasticity can be small
to account the quarterly fluctuations in trade balances and terms of trade, or high
to account the growth in trade due to trade liberalization. In Kose, Towe and
Meredith (2004) they propose this elasticity of substitution to be 1.05 for Mexico
when analyzing the NAFTA effect on trade. We choose not to use this level
due to the different time span of study we are interested. Nevertheless, we find
that other updated papers for the Mexican economy have a similar elasticity of
substitution that considers the trade liberalization that Mexico has experienced
in the past decades. We use the elasticity of substitution between domestic and
foreign goods presented in Cuadra and Nuguer (2016) to calibrate η. They use
an elasticity of subtitution of 1.5556, which implies a parameter η of -0.3571.
We use the intratemporal condition (2.9) in order to calibrate the home bias
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parameter. Realise that the intratemporal condition can be rewritten as
(
cf
C
)1+η
= (1− λ)P(p;λ, η)
p
(2.13)
In order to construct the series of consumption of foreign goods, we obtain from
the Mexican central bank the annual share of imported consumption goods from
total imports from 1997 to 2015. We find that the average share is of 13.18%
during this period19. Using total imports of goods and services, private final
consumption expenditure, and terms of trade quarterly series, the parameter value
of η = −0.3571, the fixed share of imported consumption goods, and the final
consumption good price index (2.10) formula; we find a series of the home bias
λt that solves in every quarter the intratemporal condition (2.13). We find that
the average home bias is of 0.8748 from 1997Q4 to 2016Q2.
We calibrate the default GDP penalty and the discount factor in order to
match two moments of the Mexican economy. Mexico has defaulted in its sovereign
debt twice (1928 and 1982) in the last hundred years20. This gives a rough es-
timate of a 2% default probability. We then focus the targets to be this default
probability and the standard deviation of trade balance over GDP ratio shown
in Table 2.4. Finally, we keep the probability of re-entry to financial markets
proposed by Arellano (2008)21. Table 2.5 presents the parameters specification
19We also find that from 2007 to 2015 this share almost doubled from 8.5% to 14.24%. We
also find that most of this increase happened in the first six years of the sample. For this reason,
we consider this share as a constant for the calibration process.
20As noted in Reinhart and Rogoff (2009), the default years were when two important inter-
national crises happened, the Great Depression and the Emerging Markets Crises. During the
Tequila Crisis in 1994, Mexico was close to default with its international lenders. Thanks to
the internatinal help from the USA, Mexico was able to have dodge this.
21In Gelos, Sahay and Sandleris (2011), it is shown that the average waiting period for re-
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from the calibration and estimation strategy.
Table 2.5: Parameters Specification
Parameter Value Source
A
[
0.8399 −0.0291
−0.1466 0.5367
]
OLS estimators
σy 0.0105 Observed errors
σp 0.0203 Observed errors
σ 2.00 IRBC Literature
r∗ 1.62% US 10-year Treasury
η -0.3571 Cuadra and Nuguer (2016)
λ 0.8748 Intratemporal Condition
β 0.9530 Default probability
κ 0.9690 Trade balance volatility
φ 0.2820 Arellano (2008)
entry after a default has decreased significantly. They show that this average fell from 5 years
in the 1980’s to 1.6 years in the 1990’s. Nevertheless, in Alessandro et al. (2011), they conclude
that this comparison between decades is not fair. In particular, that the decrease in average
waiting period for re-entry has not decreased throughout time. They provide evidence that, if
re-entry to to financial markets do not happen after three years of the default, it is significantly
harder to achieve this re-entry. This seems to suggest that the probability of re-entry has not
experienced important movements throughout the years.
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2.5.3 Results
We use a value function iteration process using a grid search method22 to solve
the model. To study the policy rules we establish a high and low level of GDP
and terms of trade as ±0.0489% and ±0.0467% deviations from their means,
respectively. We then do a 100 simulation processes for the economy for 10,000
periods, starting with zero sovereign bond holdings and in the long-run level
of GDP and terms of trade. We burn the first 500 periods of each simulation
and compute the business cycles statistics of the model as the averages of the
simulations.
Figure 2.3 shows the boundary limits of the default set (2.6). Because of
Proposition 5 we know that these sets are monotonic with respect of the level of
sovereign bond holdings. The left panel shows the relationship with respect of
GDP fixing the terms of trade level. The default set is the area south west of
the boundaries. We find that higher levels of sovereign debt increases the levels
of GDP inside the the default set. In addition, having a higher terms of trade
level increases slightly the levels of GDP inside the default set. The right panel
shows the relationship with respect of terms of trade fixing the GDP level. The
default set is the area north west of the boundaries. We find that higher levels
of sovereign debt increases the levels of terms of trad inside the default set. In
addition, having a higher GDP levles decreases significantly the levels of terms
of trade inside the default set.
Figure 2.4 shows the pricing of the sovereign bonds. The left panel shows us
how the sovereign bond price schedule decreases in value as the sovereign bond
22We use this method as a first approach to solving the equilibrium of the model. As
Hatchondo, Martinez and Sapriza (2010) shows, grid search methods can give spurious results
in the business cycle analysis.
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Figure 2.3: Default Set Boundaries
becomes more negative. The right panel shows the implied interest rate using a
the domain of sovereign bonds in which the sovereign bond pricing is strictly pos-
itive. These graphs deliver two important features. Firstly, this model is able to
create countercyclical interest rates due to the link between probability of default
and GDP levels. Secondly, the movements of terms of trade increase in impor-
tance for sovereign bond price schedule as GDP increases. Moreover, this rise
in the price schedule dispersion increases the sovereign intrest rates possibilities.
This result helps us explain the movements of spreads during periods where GDP
is not below trend. Furthermore, it suggests that terms of trade matter when
analyzing interest rates and default likelihoods of emerging economies. This is a
step towards explaining the puzzle shown in Tomz and Wright (2007).
Table 2.6 shows the business cycle statistics of the model. The business cycles
is able to recover a couple of the statistics shown in Table 2.4. But in general,
the experiment fails because it is not able to match most of the moments in the
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Figure 2.4: Sovereign Bond Pricing and Sovereign Interest Rate
data. Despite of this, it is an important step towards understanding the flaws
and improving the model.
Table 2.6: Model Business Cycles Statistics
Variable µ σ ρ(·,Spread) ρ(·,GDP) ρ(·,TOT)
Spread 0.65% 0.74% - -0.2009 0.2567
GDP - 2.24% -0.2009 - -0.2388
Terms of Trade - 2.52% 0.2567 -0.2388 -
Consumption - 2.01% -0.3073 0.9386 -0.2376
Trade Balance 0.00% 0.09% 0.3788 -0.2628 -0.0385
Default probability 2.46% - - - -
Debt-GDP ratio 3.05% - - - -
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2.6 Conclusion
We propose a stochastic general equilibrium model of sovereign default with
endogenous default risk in order to explain the interest rate behavior in emerging
economies. We incorporate two types of shocks to cover a foreign and a domestic
uncertainty. We define as the domestic and the foreign uncertainty, GDP and
terms of trade shock, respectively. The model is able to succesfully increase
the dispersion of sovereign interest rates when GDP shocks are above the trend.
This result seems to suggest that terms of trade is a good candidate to explain
the volatility of interest rates in small open economies when they are not under
recessions or crises.
Unfortunately, our business cycles exercise have room for improvements. Nev-
ertheless, the results presented is a great step to explain the behavior of interest
rates in emerging economies. Below, we present three issues we are currently
working in order to improve our line of research.
Firstly, the VAR(1) process does not capture correctly the dynamics between
GDP and terms of trade shown in the data. This can be shown by the small
correlation between their contemporaneous realizations in the simulation process.
In particular, we are confident that E [εyt |ln pt] 6= 0, making our estimators in A
biased. Moreover, we are not implementing completely the exogeneity assumption
of terms of trade. Specifically, we let the future realization of terms of trade be
affected by the current level of GDP. Furhter work of the model will consider
improvements in the VAR(1) process presented in (2.1), for example
ln yt+1
ln pt+1
 =
a1 a2
0 a3
ln yt
ln pt
+
1 b1
0 1
εyt−1
εpt=1
 .
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Another weakness of our results is our calibration strategy. We let the toler-
ance in the algorithm to be high for a faster convergence. The tolerance provided
is of 1.0e−1, which yields really loose results. Moreover, we only do one simula-
tion process in order to compute the target statistics of default probability and
standard deviation of trade balance over GDP. Future improvements will encom-
pass a more serious calibration process with a higher tolerance and number of
simulation processes. Moreover, we will include as part of it the probability of
re-entry to financial markets by targeting the ratio of debt over GDP.
Finally, our computation of the equilibrium can improve greatly. Unfortu-
nately, having three state variables increases greatly the computational cost in
terms of time. Because of this we have coarse grids that might miss important
movements. Furthermore, as noted by Hatchondo, Martinez and Sapriza (2010),
grid search methods can yield spurious results in the business cycles statitics of
the model. Future improvements will work on this by imposing finer grids in
the state variables. In addition, we will move from the grid search method to
methods that are able to capture movements between the grid elements23.
23There are a great variety of methods that allow movements inside the grid elements. In
particular, we are currently working on linear and quadratic interpolation methods. We are also
interested in implementing innovative methods that have shown effiency in solving these types
of models. Specifically, we are interested in the alogorithms provided in McGrattan (1996) and
Gordon and Qiu (2015).
Chapter 3
Optimal foreign currency debt
denomination
3.1 Introduction
The popular question regarding debt currency denomination is whether it
should be incurred in domestic or foreign currency. This question has been stud-
ied extensively regarding private and sovereign governments, focusing in the ben-
efits and shortcomings from issuing debt in a currency different to the domestic
currency. For example, Du and Schreger (2015) study the patters of sovereign
debt in domestic and foreign currency across time. However, not all foreign cur-
rencies are the same, and this dimension is missing in the literature. The question
I address in this paper is, what type of foreign currency should a country issue
debt? In particular, should a country issue debt in its trade partner currency? I
find that as an economy falls into a recession and more debt issuance is desired,
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issuing debt in a currency not linked to its trading partner currencies becomes
attractive.
3.2 Two Period Model
Consider a two period small open economy inhabited with a representative
firm, a representative household, and a benevolent government. There are two
different type of foreign goods. One of the foreign goods is linked with the trade
in the small open economy has. The real exchange rate between this foreign good
and the domestic produced good will be the terms of trade p. On the other hand,
the other foreign good is not linked to the trade in the small open economy. The
real exchange rate between this foreign and the domestic produced goods can be
described by e. In the first period there is no uncertainty and the terms of trade
and the real exchange rate start at their long-run level p and e, respectively. For
simplicity, I will assume these long-run levels are the same and normalized to
one. Nevertheless, in the second period there is uncertainty regarding both, the
terms of trade p and the real exchange rate e.
3.2.1 Representative Household
The representative household maximizes its two period utility by consuming
final goods. Every period, the total disposable income of the household comes
from the profits of representative firm and a lump-sum tax/transfer by the gov-
ernment. The utility maximization problem of the household can be expressed
77
as
Max
c
{u (c1) + βE [u (c2)]}
s.t. c1 = pi1 + T1
c2 = pi2 + T2
where the utility function u (·) is a strictly increasing and concave function and
β ∈ (0, 1) the discount factor.
3.2.2 Representative Firm
The representative firm every period observes the terms of trade realization
and maximize its profits by purchasing foreign intermediate inputs. The profit
maximization problem can be expressed as
pi (p) = Max
Y,M
{Y − pM}
s.t. Y = zMα
The first order condition of the previous problem yields the following optimal
allocations
Mˆ (p) =
(
αz
p
) 1
1−α
, Yˆ (p) =
(
z
(
α
p
)α) 11−α
, and
pi (p) = (1− α)
(
z
(
α
p
)α) 11−α
.
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3.2.3 Foreign International Lenders
The foreign international lenders can invest in a world risk-free asset and in
two different risky government bonds in the first period. For simplicity, I assume
that the risk-free asset and one of the risky government bonds are denominated
in the same foreign good. The other risky government bond will be denominated
in the foreign good the small open economy has a trade relationship with. The
international lenders have deep pockets in the first period and are assumed to
be risk-neutral. The maximization problem of the international lenders can be
described as
Max
{
x1 +
1
1 + rex2
}
s.t. x1 = I − qebe − qpbp
x2 = Ep,e
[
(1− de)be + (1− dp)p
e
bp
]
,
where the de and dp represent if the government default in the risky bond in the
second period. The first order conditions of this problem yield the following debt
pricing rules
qe =
1
1 + re
E [(1− de)] and qp = 11 + reE
[
(1− dp)p
e
]
.
3.2.4 Benevolent Government
The government is benevolent with respect of the representative household’s
welfare and issues debt b in the first period and in the second period chooses
either to default or repay it. The government issues new debt in the first period
and it can choose whether to issue debt in the currency of its trade partner (real
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exchange rate of p) or in a different independent currency (real exchange rate
of e). If it defaults in the second period, it will receive a penalty of κ ∈ (0, 1)
tradabale goods over the total profits of the representative firm. Finally, the
government starts with an initial amount of debt to be paid in final goods b0.
The maximization problem in the first period of the benevolent government can
be summarized in
V (b0) = Max {Vp(b0), Ve(b0)} , (3.1)
where Vp(b0) and Ve(b0) represent the environment of choosing foreign denomi-
nated debt in the trade partner currency or the independent currency, respec-
tively. The maximization problem when debt is in the trade partner currency
can be expressed as
Vp(b0) = Max
c1,c2,b
{u (c1) + βEp [u (c2)]}
s.t. c1 + b0 = pi (p) + qp (b) b
c2 =
pi (p)− pb if repays(1− κ)pi (p) if defaults
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On the other hand, the maximization problem when debt is in the an independent
foreign currency can be expressed as
Ve(b0) = Max
c1,c2,b
{u (c1) + βEp,e [u (c2)]}
s.t. c1 + b0 = pi (p) + qe (b) b
c2 =
pi (p)− eb if repays(1− κ)pi (p) if defaults
3.2.5 Equilibrium
Let us describe the default sets for both problems as
Dp(b) ≡ {p ∈ R+ : u ((1− κ)pi(p)) > u (pi(p)− pb)} and (3.2)
De(b) ≡
{
(p, e) ∈ R2+ : u ((1− κ)pi(p)) > u (pi(p)− eb)
}
. (3.3)
Using these sets, we can rewrite the debt pricing as
qp(b) =
1
1 + re
∫ ∫
p∈Dp(b)
p
e
dF (p)dF (e) and (3.4)
qe(b) =
1
1 + re
∫
(p,e)∈De(b)
dF (p, e). (3.5)
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Moreover, we can define the second period discounted expected utility as
Vp(b) ≡ βEp [u(c2)]
= β
[∫
p∈Dp(b)
u(pi(p)− pb)dF (p) +
∫
p/∈Dp(b)
u((1− κ)pi(p))dF (p)
]
and
Ve(b) ≡ βEp,e [u(c2)]
= β
[∫
(p,e)∈De(b)
u(pi(p)− eb)dF (p, e) +
∫
(p,e)/∈De(b)
u((1− κ)pi(p))dF (p, e)
]
.
Figure 3.1 shows these relationships and how they change when higher debt is
issued in the first period. Figure 3.1(a) shows us that for low levels of debt, there
is a higher price for debt issued in the trading partner currency. Nevertheless,
this changes as higher debt starts to be issued. This can be explained as the
more likely the government is to default, a negative terms of trade shock makes
profits fall and debt to rise, making default attractive when debt is issued in the
trade partner currency. Nevertheless, when debt is issued in a different foreign
exchange rate, when terms of trade deteriorate, profits fall but debt does not
necessarily increases. As a matter of fact, the exchange rate may appreciate,
making the debt burden fall and making default not as attractive. Figure 3.1(b)
shows the discounted expected utility from the second period. It also shows that
as debt increases and comes closer to default, issuing debt in a foreign currency
not linked to the trade partner is more attractive due to the possibility of an
appreciation of the currency, making the debt burden in the second period to
fall.
Using these definitions, I state the following definition for a recursive equilib-
rium of the two period model.
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(a) Debt pricing
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Trading partner currency
Independent foreign currency
(b) Discounted expected value
0.00 0.01 0.02 0.03 0.04 0.05
-13
-12
-11
-10
Trading partner currency
Independent foreign currency
Figure 3.1: Debt pricing and second period discounted expected value contingent
in debt
Note: To construct these functions contingent to debt I use the parameters established in the
following section. The debt axis is regarding the debt incurred in the first period.
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Definition 9 (Recursive Equilibrium) A recursive equilibrium with initial
debt b0 is defined as value functions {V (b0), Vp(b0), Ve(b0)}, a set of debt pricing
schedules {qp(b), qe(b)}, and default sets {Dp(b),De(b)}; such that the following
conditions are satisfied:
1. The decision of whether to issue debt in the trade partner currency or a
different foreign currency satisfies (3.1).
2. Taking the debt pricing schedule qp(b), the following problem is solved
Vp(b0) = Max
b
{u (pi (p) + qp (b) b− b0) + Vp(b)} .
3. Taking the debt pricing schedule qe(b), the following problem is solved
Ve(b0) = Max
b
{u (pi (p) + qe (b) b− b0) + Ve(b)} .
4. The default sets satisfy (3.2) and (3.3).
5. The debt pricing schedules satisfy (3.4) and (3.5).
3.3 Quantitative Analysis
In this section, I pick the functional forms and values to the parameters of the
model. I solve for both currencies a grid search method to find the optimal debt.
Then I choose the the currency that yields the highest utility in the first period
given an initial debt paid in the first period. I then study how the currency choice
change as the initial debt increases.
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3.3.1 Baseline Calibration
I calibrate the model taking parameters values widely accepted in the litera-
ture. I discretize the initial debt, the period 1 debt, and the terms of trade space
into grids of 5001 elements each. For the grids regarding debt, the elements are
going to be equally separated from 0.0 to 0.1. For the terms of trade, I follow
Tauchen and Hussey (1991) to obtain the probability transition matrix and the
elements of the grid for an AR(1) process. For the stochastic process of the dif-
ferent exchange rate, I take set it to take only two values in such a way that
the average of the exchange rate shock is the long-run level of the terms of trade
shock.
Functional Forms. The utility function is a standard CRRA
u(c) = c
1−γ
1− γ ,
where γ represents the risk aversion parameter of the households.
I assume a decreasing returns to scale production function
F (M) = zMα,
where α < 1.
I assume the log terms of trade process follow an AR(1) process
ln (p′) = ρ ln(p) + σε
where the auto-correlation parameter satisfy |ρ|< 0, and the shocks are i.i.d. and
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normal distributed, ε ∼ N(0, 1).
Finally, I assume that the real exchange rate follow a Bernoulli distribution
with parameter λ. I also set that the mean of the exchange rate coincides with
the long-run level of the terms of trade shock.
Model Parameters. Table 3.1 shows all the baseline calibration values for
the parameters of the model. I set values of the parameters widely used in the
literature. I normalize the productivity of the final good production as well as the
long-run level of the log terms of trade stochastic process. Its auto-correlation
and standard deviation are consistent to the values found in the literature.
Table 3.1: Calibration table
Parameter Value
p 1.00
e 1.00
z 1.00
αM 0.75
γ 2.00
λ 0.80
ρ 0.50
σ 0.08
r 1.01
β 0.99
Figure 3.2 show the optimal debt of the sovereign government contingent to
an initial debt the government needs to pay in the first period. This can also
be seen as a contraction in the economy measuring an initial crisis in the first
period. This makes the government incur in more debt and therefore more close
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to a default scenario in the second period. Figure 3.2(a) show the optimal debt
incurred in each type of foreign currency denomination. Figure 3.2(b) portrays
the same curves but considering considering when it is optimal to incur the debt
in the trading partner currency or not. The main message of the model is that
the higher debt is needed in the first period, issuing debt in a different currency
becomes more attractive. The figure shows that for initial debt levels of 0.72,
debt in the trading partner currency is optimal. However, for higher levels of
initial debt, the government will find more attractive to issue debt in a currency
not linked to its terms of trade.
(a) Optimal debt
0.00 0.02 0.04 0.06 0.08 0.10
0.005
0.010
0.015
0.020
0.025
(b) Optimal currency
0.00 0.02 0.04 0.06 0.08 0.10
0.005
0.010
0.015
0.020
0.025
Figure 3.2: Optimal debt issuance contingent to initial debt
3.4 Conclusion
In this paper, I deviate from the question of whether a country should issue
debt in domestic or foreign currency. Instead I focus in the question of what
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type of foreign currency should a country issue its debt. To answer this question
I create a two period model where a sovereign government chooses whether to
issue debt in a currency tied to their terms of trade or not. I find that when a
government is not in a recession, a government is more prone to choose a foreign
currency linked to their trading patterns. Nevertheless, as soon as a government
is in a recession and needs to incur in higher levels of debt, changing to a currency
not linked to its trading patterns becomes more attractive. This is due to the
probability of the domestic currency to appreciate and contract the debt burden
when there is a deterioration in the terms of trade.
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Chapter 4
Appendix
4.1 Propositions proofs
4.1.1 Proposition 4 (Recursive Equilibrium Isomorphism)
Proof Let us use this intratemporal condition (2.9) and the household’s final
consumption aggregator,
C =
(
λc−ηd + (1− λ)c−ηf
)− 1
η
= cd
(
λ
(
1 +
(
1− λ
λ
)(
cd
cf
)η))− 1η
= cd
λ
1 + (1− λ
λ
)((
λ
1− λ
)
p
) η
1+η
−
1
η
= cd
λ
1 + (1− λ
λ
) 1
1+η
p
η
1+η
−
1
η
=
(
cd
λ
1
1+η
)(
λ
1
1+η + (1− λ) 11+η p η1+η
)− 1
η
.
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Using the final consumption good price index (2.10), we can rewrite the previous
expression as
c1+ηd
λ
= P(p)C1+η. (4.1)
Using the the intratemporal condition (2.9) and mixing the budget and the bal-
anced trade constraints of (2.4) and (2.5), we can realise that the consumption
of domestic and foreign expenditure can be expressed as
cd + pcf = cd +
(
1− λ
λ
)(
cd
cf
)1+η
cf
= cd +
(
1− λ
λ
)
c1+ηd c
−η
f
=
(
c1+ηd
λ
)(
λc−ηd + (1− λ)c−ηf
)
= c
1+η
d
λCη
.
Thus, using (4.1) we reach the expression that the household’s consumption ex-
penditure can be expressed in terms of the final consumption good and the final
consumption good price index (2.10),
cd + pcf = P(p)C.
Furthermore, using (2.9) and (4.1), we can construct how the consumption of
domestic and foreign goods can be decomposed from the aggregate final con-
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sumption good as
cd = (λP(p))
1
1+η C and cf =
(
(1− λ)P(p)
p
) 1
1+η
C.
Finally, realise that the restrictions of the maximization problems (2.4) and (2.5)
are the same as the ones described in (2.11) and (2.12).
4.1.2 Proposition 5 (Default Sets Monotonicity)
Proof Set a level of sovereign debt B1 and levels of output and terms of trade
such that (y, p) ∈ D(B1). Then, it follows that V D(y, p) > V R(B1, y, p). Pick an
arbitrary level of sovereign debt B2 such that B2 ≤ B1. Let us study the resource
constraint in (2.11). Define the budget set of the government contingent to the
amount of sovereign bonds due as
B(B) = {(C,B′) ∈ R+ × [B,∞) : P (p)C + pq(B′, y, p) ≤ y + pB} .
By construction, acknowledge that B(B2) ⊆ B(B1). Because the government is
maximizing over a subset of a set, it follows that V R(B1, y, p) ≥ V R(B2, y, p).
Joining the inequalities, we conclude that
V D(y, p) > V R(B1, y, p) ≥ V R(B2, y, p).
In other words, (y, p) ∈ D(B2). Finally, because the levels of sovereign debt B2
was taken arbitrarily, we can conclude that D(B1) ⊆ D(B2).
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4.1.3 Proposition 6 (No Resources Inflows)
Proof Pick an arbitrary (y, p) ∈ D(B) and realise this implies V D(y, p) >
V R(B, y, p). Acknowledge that the resource constraints found in (2.11) and in
(2.12) can be rewritten respectively as
C = yP(p) −
p
P(p) (q(B
′)B′ −B) and C = yP(p) .
Therefore,
u
(
y
P(p)
)
+ βE(y′,p′)
[
V D(y′, p′)
]
>
> Max
B′
{
u
(
y − p(q(B′)B′ −B)
P(p)
)
+ βE(y′,p′) [V (y′, p′)]
}
≥ Max
B′
{
u
(
y − p(q(B′)B′ −B)
P(p)
)
+ βE(y′,p′)
[
V D(y′, p′)
]}
≥ u
(
y − p(q(B′)B′ −B)
P(p)
)
+ βE(y′,p′)
[
V D(y′, p′)
]
,
for all feasible B′. Thus,
u
(
y
P(p)
)
> u
(
y
P(p) −
p
P(p) (q(B
′)B′ −B)
)
.
Because u(·) is an increasing function,
y
P(p) ≥
y
P(p) −
p
P(p) (q(B
′)B′ −B) .
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Then, we arrive to
q(B′)B′ −B ≥ 0.
Finally, because we picked an arbitrary (y, p) ∈ D(B), we can conclude that for
all feasible B′ there are no resources inflows, q(B′)B′ −B ≥ 0.
4.1.4 Proposition 7 (GDP Default Incentives)
Proof Set a level of GDP, terms of trade and sovereign bonds such that (y1, p) ∈
D(B) 6= ∅. Then, it follows that V D(y1, p) > V R(B, y1, p). Pick an arbitrary
level of GDP y2 such that y2 ≤ y1. Acknowledge that the resource constraints
found in (2.11) and in (2.12) can be rewritten respectively as
C = yP(p) −
p
P(p) (q(B
′)B′ −B) and C = yP(p) .
To make the proof easier, call
B′1 = arg Max
B′
{
u
(
y1
P(p) −
p
P(p) (q(B
′
1)B′1 −B)
)
+ βE(y′,p′) [V (B′1, y′, p′)]
}
&
B′2 = arg Max
B′
{
u
(
y2
P(p) −
p
P(p) (q(B
′
2)B′2 −B)
)
+ βE(y′,p′) [V (B′2, y′, p′)]
}
.
99
Realise that, in particular, these expressions imply,
u
(
y1
P(p) −
p
P(p) (q(B
′
1)B′1 −B)
)
+ βE(y′,p′) [V (B′1, y′, p′)] ≥
u
(
y1
P(p) −
p
P(p) (q(B
′
2)B′2 −B)
)
+ βE(y′,p′) [V (B′2, y′, p′)] .
Using Proposition 6 and because D(B) 6= ∅ and u(·) is increasing, it follows
that q(B′)B′−B ≥ 0 for every feasible B′. In particular, for the optimal level of
sovereign bonds using y2 level of GDP, q(B′2)B′2 −B ≥ 0.
Because u(·) is strictly concave and q(B′2)B′2 −B ≥ 0, we know that
u
(
y1
P(p) −
p
P(p) (q(B
′
2)B′2 −B)
)
− u
(
y2
P(p) −
p
P(p) (q(B
′
2)B′2 −B)
)
≥
≥ u
(
y1
P(p)
)
− u
(
y1
P(p)
)
.
Moreover, the right hand side can be expressed as
u
(
y1
P(p)
)
− u
(
y2
P(p)
)
=
(
u
(
y1
P(p)
)
+ βE(y′,p′) [V (y′, p′)]
)
−
(
u
(
y2
P(p)
)
+ βE(y′,p′) [V (y′, p′)]
)
= V D(y1, p)− V D(y2, p).
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Therefore,
V D(y1, p)− V D(y2, p) ≤ u
(
y1
P(p) −
p
P(p) (q(B
′
2)B′2 −B)
)
− u
(
y2
P(p) −
p
P(p) (q(B
′
2)B′2 −B)
)
=
(
u
(
y1
P(p) −
p
P(p) (q(B
′
2)B′2 −B)
)
+ βE(y′,p′) [V (B′2, y′, p′)]
)
−
(
u
(
y2
P(p) −
p
P(p) (q(B
′
2)B′2 −B)
)
+ βE(y′,p′) [V (B′2, y′, p′)]
)
≤
(
u
(
y1
P(p) −
p
P(p) (q(B
′
1)B′1 −B)
)
+ βE(y′,p′) [V (B′1, y′, p′)]
)
−
(
u
(
y2
P(p) −
p
P(p) (q(B
′
2)B′2 −B)
)
+ βE(y′,p′) [V (B′2, y′, p′)]
)
= V R(B, y1, p)− V R(B, y2, p)
< V D(y1, p)− V R(B, y2, p).
Then we arrive to following expression V D(y2, p) > V R(B, y2, p). Finally we can
conclude, because the level of GDP y2 was taken arbitrarily, we can conclude that
(y2, p) ∈ D(B).
4.1.5 Proposition 8 (Terms of Trade Default Incentives)
Proof Set a level of GDP, terms of trade and sovereign bonds such that (y, p1) ∈
D(B) 6= ∅. Then, it follows that V D(y, p1) > V R(B, y, p1). Pick an arbitrary level
of terms of trade p2 such that p2 ≥ p1. Acknowledge that the resource constraints
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found in (2.11) and in (2.12) can be rewritten respectively as
C = yP(p) −
p
P(p) (q(B
′)B′ −B) and C = yP(p) .
To make the proof easier, call
B′1 = arg Max
B′
{
u
(
y
P(p1) −
p1
P(p1) (q(B
′
1)B′1 −B)
)
+ βE(y′,p′) [V (B′1, y′, p′)]
}
&
B′2 = arg Max
B′
{
u
(
y
P(p2) −
p2
P(p2) (q(B
′
2)B′2 −B)
)
+ βE(y′,p′) [V (B′2, y′, p′)]
}
.
Realise that, in particular, these expressions imply,
u
(
y
P(p1) −
p1
P(p1) (q(B
′
1)B′1 −B)
)
+ βE(y′,p′) [V (B′1, y′, p′)] ≥
u
(
y
P(p1) −
p1
P(p1) (q(B
′
2)B′2 −B)
)
+ βE(y′,p′) [V (B′2, y′, p′)] .
Using Proposition 6 and because D(B) 6= ∅ and u(·) is increasing, it follows
that q(B′)B′−B ≥ 0 for every feasible B′. In particular, for the optimal level of
sovereign bonds using y2 level of GDP, q(B′2)B′2 −B ≥ 0.
Acknowledge that the final consumption good price index is increasing,
P ′(p) =
(
(1− λ)P(p)
p
) 1
1+η
≥ 0.
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Therefore, the ratio pP(p) is increasing too,
d
dp
(
p
P(p)
)
= P(p)− pP
′(p)
(P(p))2
= 1− (1− λ)
1
1+η p
η
1+η (P(p))− η1+η
P(p)
= (P(p))
η
1+η − (1− λ) 11+η p η1+η
(P(p)) 1+2η1+η
=
(
λ
(P(p))1+2η
) 1
1+η
≥ 0.
In other words, it follows that p2P(p2) ≥ p1P(p1) because p2 ≥ p1.
Using the previous result and because u(·) is strictly concave and
q(B′2)B′2 −B ≥ 0, we know that
u
(
y
P(p1)
)
− u
(
y
P(p2)
)
≤ u
(
y
P(p1) −
p2
P(p2) (q(B
′
2)B′2 −B)
)
− u
(
y
P(p2) −
p2
P(p2) (q(B
′
2)B′2 −B)
)
≤ u
(
y
P(p1) −
p1
P(p1) (q(B
′
2)B′2 −B)
)
− u
(
y
P(p2) −
p2
P(p2) (q(B
′
2)B′2 −B)
)
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Moreover, the left hand side can be expressed as
u
(
y
P(p1)
)
− u
(
y
P(p2)
)
=
(
u
(
y
P(p1)
)
+ βE(y′,p′) [V (y′, p′)]
)
−
(
u
(
y
P(p2)
)
+ βE(y′,p′) [V (y′, p′)]
)
= V D(y, p1)− V D(y, p2).
Therefore,
V D(y, p1)− V D(y, p2) ≤
≤ u
(
y
P(p1) −
p1
P(p1) (q(B
′
2)B′2 −B)
)
− u
(
y
P(p2) −
p2
P(p2) (q(B
′
2)B′2 −B)
)
=
(
u
(
y
P(p1) −
p1
P(p1) (q(B
′
2)B′2 −B)
)
+ βE(y′,p′) [V (B′2, y′, p′)]
)
−
(
u
(
y
P(p2) −
p2
P(p2) (q(B
′
2)B′2 −B)
)
+ βE(y′,p′) [V (B′2, y′, p′)]
)
≤
(
u
(
y
P(p1) −
p1
P(p1) (q(B
′
1)B′1 −B)
)
+ βE(y′,p′) [V (B′1, y′, p′)]
)
−
(
u
(
y
P(p2) −
p2
P(p) (q(B
′
2)B′2 −B)
)
+ βE(y′,p′) [V (B′2, y′, p′)]
)
= V R(B, y, p1)− V R(B, y, p2)
< V D(y, p1)− V R(B, y, p2).
Then we arrive to following expression V D(y, p2) > V R(B, y, p2). Finally we can
conclude, because the level of terms of trade p2 was taken arbitrarily, we can
conclude that (y, p2) ∈ D(B).
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4.2 Computational algorithm
We extend the algoritm described in Arellano (2008) and incorporate the one
loop enhancement proposed in Hatchondo, Martinez and Sapriza (2010) using a
grid search method. The following is the algorithm we follow to solve the model
proposed in Definition 3 and the calibration strategy for the discount factor β
and the GDP default penalty parameter κ:
1) Fix the calibration targets of default probability d¯ and standard deviation
of trade balance over GDP s¯.
2) Discretize B space and dicretize (y,p) space using Tauchen and Hussey
(1991)
3) Propose a guess for the discount factor β and the GDP default penalty
parameter κ,
β = 0.95 andκ = 1.00
4) Propose a guess for the set of value functions V , V R, V D and the sovereign
bond price schedule q,
V = [0], V R = [0], V D = [0], and q =
[ 1
1 + r∗
]
.
5) For every state (B, y, p), solve the repayment state maximization problem
(2.11) and compute an implied repayment state value function Vˆ R.
6) For every state (y, p), solve the repayment state maximization problem
(2.12) and compute an implied default state value function Vˆ D.
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7) For every state (B, y, p), solve the maximization problem and compute an
implied default state value function Vˆ .
8) Using the implied value functions Vˆ R and Vˆ D, construct default set D
9) Using the default set D, construct default probability schedule δ
10) Using the default probability schedule δ, construct an implied sovereign
bond price schedule qˆ
11) Compute the error term as
z1 = ||V − Vˆ ||∞+||V R − Vˆ R||∞+||V D − Vˆ D||∞+||q − qˆ||∞.
12) Update guesses V = Vˆ , V R = Vˆ R, V D = Vˆ D, and q = qˆ.
13) If z1 ≥ 1.0e−6, return to 5).
14) Construct one simulation of 10,000 periods with 500 burn-ins starting with
the zero sovereign bonds and the long-run levels of GDP and terms of trade
15) Construct the implied default probability α and the implied standard de-
viation of trade balance over GDP s
16) Compute the error term as
z2 =
∣∣∣d− d¯∣∣∣+ |s− s¯|
2 .
17) If z2 ≥ 1.0e−1, update guesses β and κ, then return to 4)
